Sunday 31 May 2015

Research questions about technology use in education in developing countries

let's investigate this systematically ...
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Research questions about
technology use in education in
developing countries
SUBMITTED BY MICHAEL TRUCANO ON WED,
05/27/2015
Back in 2005, I helped put together a 'quick
guide to ICT and education challenges and
research questions' in developing countries . This
list was meant to inform a research program at
the time sponsored by the World Bank's
infoDev program, but I figured I'd make it public,
because the barriers to publishing were so low
(copy -> paste -> save -> upload) and in case
doing so might be useful to anyone else.
While I don't know to what extent others may
have actually found this list helpful, I have seen
this document referenced over the years in
various funding proposals, and by other funding
agencies. Over the past week I've (rather
surprisingly) heard two separate organizations
reference this rather old document in the course
of considering some of their research priorities
going forward related to investigating possible
uses of information and communication
technologies (ICTs) to help meet educational
goals in low income and middle countries around
the world, and so I wondered how these 50
research questions had held up over the years.
Are they still relevant?
And :
What did we miss, ignore or not understand?
The list of research questions to be investigated
going forward was a sort of companion
document to Knowledge maps: What we know
(and what we don't) about ICT use in education
in developing countries . It was in many ways a
creature of its time and context. The formulation
of the research questions identified was in part
influenced by some stated interests of the
European Commission (which was co-funding
some of the work) and I knew that some
research questions would resonate with other
potential funders at the time (including the World
Bank itself) who were interested in related areas
(see, for example, the first and last research
questions). The list of research questions was
thus somewhat idiosynscratic, did not presume
to be comprehensive in its treatment of the
topic, and was intended meant to imply that
certain areas of research interest were 'more
important' than others not included on the list.
That said, in general the list seems to have held
up quite well, and many of the research
questions from 2005 continue to resonate in
2015. In some ways, this resonance is
unfortunate, as it suggests that we still don't
know answers to a lot of very basic questions.
Indeed, in some cases we may know as little in
2015 as we knew in 2015, despite the explosion
of activity and investment (and rhetoric) in
exploring the relevance of technology use in
education to help meet a wide variety of
challenges faced by education systems,
communities, teachers and learners around the
world. This is not to imply that we haven't
learned anything, of course (an upcoming
EduTech blog post will look at two very useful
surveys of research findings that have been
published in the past year), but that we still have
a long way to go.
Some comments and observations,
with the benefit of hindsight and when looking
forward
The full list of research questions from 2005 is
copied at the bottom of this blog post (here's
the original list as published, with explanation
and commentary on individual items).
Reviewing this list, a few things jump out at me:

1. Challenges in extrapolating research findings
from one (highly developed) place to another
(less developed) place
The operating hypothesis when formulating this
list was that answers to some of these questions
might be different in environments and contexts
often found in less developed countries ('LDCs')
than they would be in highly industrialized
countries where related issues had been largely
'solved' -- or at least where there was expert
consensus on the best way forward (even if that
consensus was not having demonstrable impact
on actual practice). Related to this, it was
assumed that certain questions might be more
important or relevant to ask when considering
circumstances in less developed countries
(research questions around 'interactive radio'
might still be quite useful to explore in Sub-
Saharan Africa, for example, even if the use of
educational radio had largely died out across
Europe). Given what has been learned over the
past decade, I think that this hypothesis holds up
rather well -- in fact, failed efforts to simply
export 'solutions' from education systems in
'highly developed' countries to developing
countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America
underscore for me the need for applied research
on educational technology approaches and
applications tailored to meet the needs and
contexts of decisionmakers in less developed
countries . What works well in Oslo may not work
well in Ouagadougou -- and vice versa.

2. The link between research & policymaking
Another rather important assumption (perhaps
'conceit' is the more appropriate word) that
animated this list of research questions was that
research can play an important role in informing
policy decisions related to technology use in
education. As someone who spends a lot of time
helping to translate research findings into
language that policymakers can understand and
act on, and to communicate knowledge needs of
policymakers to the research community, I of
course would like to believe that this assumption
holds. Unfortunately, though, based on
observations of hundreds of educational
technology projects over the past decade, it is
pretty clear to me that, in too many cases,
investments in educational technologies remain a
largely faith-based initiative in many places
around the world.

3. Equity issues
The number of research questions highlighting
issues related to marginalized communities and
the potential for differential impacts upon groups
within those communities (related to e.g. gender,
ethnicity, socioeconomic status, language and
geography) is notable. Unfortunately, these still
remain areas with insufficient research attention,
especially as may relate to findings that may
impact policymakers and/or which may inform
the daily work of practitioners and local
stakeholder groups.

4. A growing amount of research, but ...
There has been notable growth in academic
research investigating uses of education
technologies in developing countries over the
past decade, both on the part of academics in
'developed' countries, and those in developing
countries themselves. This is no doubt a good
thing (especially the growth in local research and
practitioner communities). Events like eLearning
Africa provide valuable fora for research and
practitioner groups to network with each other
close(r) to home (as opposed to having to meet
in London or Washington or Berlin in order to
share findings with a critical mass of like-minded
groups and people). That said, the most
remarkable change in this regard for me has been
the amount of corporate-sponsored research
which has grown up over the past ten years to
investigate issues related to technology use in
education in developing countries. This is largely
a consequence, I think, of the increased
recognition by companies that many markets
which were once considered 'frontier' are
growing rapidly, and that many of them
increasingly represent places where there is
money to be made in the near term. The heady
growth and diffusion of mobile telephony in most
of the developing world is the most obvious
marker of the fact that, for many companies,
countries in Africa and Asia are no longer
'emerging', but rather increasingly occupy places
front and center in corporate investment
strategies. One of the occasional benefits of my
job is that, even though I refuse to sign NDAs, I
from time to time get peeks into internal
corporately-funded research that is never
published. Some of it is really quite good, it is a
shame that so much of it stays locked away
within companies even after the point where it
no longer would convey a competitive advantage
to the firm that sponsored it. What's released
publicly as 'white papers' often reads to me
more like it was written by the marketing
department than something that can inform
decisionmaking by other groups in useful ways.

5. What is (was) trendy (and what's missing)
Specific mention of a number of things (e.g.
'community telecentres') appears rather quaint
from the vantage point of 2015 , but there aren't
too many buzzwords in evidence in the list from
2005 that are no longer relevant a decade later. I
am asked often to provide input on 'emerging
research topics in educational technology around
the world', and I note that a lot of things that
feature prominently in such efforts are wholly
absent from the 2005 list. For example, the
earlier list of research questions contains:
no mentions of mobile learning (although
handheld devices are mentioned, research
question #29)
no mention of MOOCs
no mention of open education resources , or
OER (although open source software is
mentioned in research question #32; while
there is no specific mention of intellectual
property issues, these were actually meant
to be considered as part of investigations
into questions related to digital content,
see research questions #39-41)
no mention of data privacy or security (this
is a *huge* omission from the perspective
of 2015, in my opinion, even if as a
practical matter it remains largely off the
radar screen of educational policymakers
in most countries)
no mention of child digital safety issues
no mention of game-based learning (or
gamification)
no mention of the potential use and impact
of social media in education
no mention of '21st century skills' (there is
mention of 'computer literacy' in research
question #2)
no mention of how ICTs might be relevant
to discussions of things like ' grit' or
' mindset ' (which are of increasing
research and policy interest in 2015), nor
of 'big data' or sensors, 'learning
analytics' or 'personalized learning', nor of
many other topics considered hot topics for
exploration today (Audrey Watters has a
useful list of other current educational
technology 'buzzwords' ; one item that
doesn't make her list, but which I have
seen crop up in a number of research
proposals lately, relates to the potential
use of drones in education)
no mention of power or electricity (these
were of course certainly well known at the
time, but they were not identified for
specific attention in the 2005 list; despite
improvements in electrification over the
past decade, increased demand as a result
of the increase in availability and use of
electronic gadgets has in many ways made
this even more important today than it
was back then)
*no specific attention to specific Internet
connectivity options (one suspects that
'satellite provision' would have been
mentioned as part of such a question)
and finally,
*no consideration of technology use within a
wider systems approach to education (as
features prominently in the World
Bank's education strategy , for example,
and its work under its flagship
SABER analytical initiative)
---
So:
Is this list of research questions related to ICT
use in education in developing countries
comprehensive?
No, certainly not. For better or worse, there is a
lot missing, especially when one considers
certain categories of edtech-related research
that are popular in certain circles.
Does it reflect the 'top' or most pressing, most
urgent research questions?
No: It did aspire to do so in 2005, and it still
does not do so from the perspective of 2015.
That said, there appears much in this list of
research questions that is relevant today -- and
indeed remains under-explored.
---
By far the most common research-type question
I am asked today is some variation of: What is
the impact of (this type of) technology on
education? This is a fair question, to be sure. I
often find that my reflexive reply to this
seemingly simple question ("it depends: what are
you trying to accomplish?") is often not viewed
as tremendously satisfying by many people.
While I increasingly come across academic
papers which attempt to identify the 'impact' of
the use of a particular educational technology or
technology-enabled approach, I remain quite
frustrated that there is comparatively little
interest in a related but, from the perspective of
the people who make huge and often very costly
decisions about such stuff, far more important
and practical questions related to understanding
how or why this 'impact' occurred: under what
specific contexts or circumstances did it take
place; what was the related enabling
environment or key factors that led to failure ;
what were the costs of achieving this impact;
etc. (A recent interesting paper examining The
Effect of Access to Information and
Communication Technology on Household Labor
Income: Evidence from One Laptop Per Child in
Uruguay is one of dozens of examples of
research that identifies and investigates 'impact',
but offers little guidance for policymakers on
specific circumstances, contexts or explanations
of why and how such impact may have been
achieved.)
---
Last week global leaders in education, ministers,
policy-makers and representatives of civil
society, teachers, experts and the private sector
met in Korea at the World Education Forum to
take stock of successes and failures over the
past quarter century related to the achievement
of initiatives aimed to help bring about Education
For All and to jointly chart a way forward over
the next decades. The resulting Incheon
Declaration identified a series of principles and
steps "towards inclusive and equitable quality
education and lifelong learning for all".
Whatever the future holds for educators, learners
and education systems in the years ahead, there
can be little doubt that considerations of, and
decisions about, education models and practices
will increasingly include contemplations of the
use of a variety of information and
communication technologies, in a variety of
ways, to help meet a variety of goals and
objectives. Even if their use is not (yet) relevant
or cost effective in certain contexts and
circumstances, 'ICTs' will increasingly be part of
discussions about the 'future of education'.
Whether or not related decisions will be
evidence- or faith-based will rest in part on the
existence of a rigorous and context-relevant
research base which can help inform the
development of educational policies; related
implementation plans; and administrative,
teaching and learning practices 'on-the-ground'.
Note : The image used at the top of this blog
post of the acclaimed Dutch phycologist Anna
Weber-van Bosse ("let's investigate this
systematically") comes from the Special
Collections of the University of Amsterdam via
Wikimedia Commons . It is (c) University of
Amsterdam, Artis Library and is used according
to the terms of its Creative Commons
Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license .

Continuation of 11Great Signs That You're Really Listening

6. Ask Questions

Questions over time have been the best way to learn more about something. I mean there is really no other way we could get to understand things or inquire about something other than questioning. In communications, a good listener will ask thoughtful questions about your topic or idea, leading you to open up more and elaborate on the discussion.

A good example of this would be when the speaker talks to you about their work and responsibilities at Company X. You could then ask what their job functions or duties are when it comes to their department in that company. Another good example is when they discuss an issue they had been facing for a while and you ask: “Why do you think that had happened?” or “How do you think we can fix this?” These are simple, open-ended questions that engage the speaker and allow him to talk more about the details.

7. Paraphrase

A good listener would wait until the end, without interrupting, and then provide a good summary or paraphrase of what the speaker just talked about and their point of view. This shows that you accept the speaker’s perspective whether you agree with it or disagree. This in turn provides the speaker with the sense that their words and opinions are accepted and that they have your support, an extremely important feeling. Saying that you understand why they did or acted this way shows that you do not necessarily agree with their act but that you recognize what they have done.

8. Feedback (Your Opinion)

Feedback is connected to validation. It is important to provide our opinion when in a conversation, because you never know if this would spark a new idea or benefit someone in one form or another.

Nowadays, we face so many distractions that it gets really hard to completely get rid of distractions altogether. Those distractions include multitasking and social media. Multitasking could be a good thing sometimes, but it can sometimes affect you too. An example of this would be the famous texting while driving. Texting while driving is a very bad and dangerous act that some people just do not understand the seriousness of. There are many and many accidents that occur because of getting distracted by texting. This is something very simple that we can avoid and will affect society positively.

The other distraction I want to talk about is social media. We have seen a lot of teenagers and college students who just cannot sit a total of an hour studying without browsing Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and the internet in general. This is another simple distraction we can discard and achieve better results. This could sometimes be the difference between passing and failing a course.

9. Provide Encouragement

Human beings feed on encouragement and motivation. These are two strong strategies to live by to lead a successful life. Let us zoom a bit on the encouragement strategy. It is always a good habit when listening to friends or others speak that you throw in encouragement phrases when they feel down. This is beneficial because when one day you are in their situation, you will find someone that will help you get up. Suitable encouragement phrases include: “I’d like to hear more,” “That is interesting,” or “Tell me more.”

10. Follow the (80% / 20% )
Rule

This rule presented here is a very practical and effective rule because it is based off logic. Did you ever wonder why we are born with two ears but only one mouth? There must be a wise reason behind that. The explanation I have is that we need to listen more than we talk and it is proven that doing so ends up creating better communication. The 80% / 20% rule is what this is all about.

A person that calls himself a good listener would know that the secret behind being a good listener is to listen approximately 80% of the time while only talking 20% of the time of the conversation. This is a very simple yet effective rule; however the problem is that we all need to implement it.

11. Interaction

Another good tactic to use as a good listener is to interact with the speaker. This could be done by simply nodding, smiling, and saying phrases like “Yeah”, “I understand what you mean”, “I see”, or perhaps “No, really?” Of course you do not say these phrases with discomfort or indicating that you do not really care about the story, you say them in an interested way to encourage the speaker to continue their story and that you are willing to listen.

Overall, listening is an important tactic to learn in order to maintain positive, mutual communications. The above are just some of the many ways you can prove to others that you are listening. More than just proving to others, you want others to treat you the same way. If you have a good listener in your life, do your best to keep them close and inform them of your appreciation. If you are still rummaging for a good listener, then wait long because the wait and search are both worth it.

Having a good listener in your life will give you a sense of comfort that you have this special someone that will always have your back and listen to what you have to say.

Do you have a good listener in your life? Tell us about what makes them so good at listening in the comments below.

11 Great Signs That You’re Really Listening

Listening is a very essential characteristic people need to have. This is because with listening, you learn more, thus understanding more, and eventually communicating and connecting better. Have you ever thought of the idea that there is a difference between hearing and listening? There is a difference for sure and that is that hearing is just looking like you are paying attention to the person talking while you are not aware of all he is saying. However, when it comes to listening, you are paying attention to the person talking, maintaining eye contact, and focusing on what he is trying to get across.

People really get annoyed when people do not listen actively to them and their stories because it makes them feel like they are not important and do not deserve time to be heard. On the other hand, listening to a person will allow them to respect you and feel like they are important and thus would like you as a person. If you want people to listen to what you have to say, then you should do the same. Some people often ignore someone who is seeking their attention, and at the same time they expect their full attention. That is just wrong.

Let us look at some of the signs that you are a good listener:

1. Maintaining Eye Contact

Would you like if you were talking to someone trying to get a point across and he is just doing something else, or looking at something else? Or would you prefer them to keep their eyes on you? Well, it has always been the norm to pay attention as someone talks and keep an eye contact with them. However, with the rise of technology and social media, communication is declining in quality.

People are on their cell phones long hours each day. Sometimes even when their parents talk to them, they would not even look at them. Now, is this appropriate? No, not really. As a matter of fact, this is often very disrespectful. Eye contact is important in conversations and is a sign you are paying attention to the person sharing his stories, advice, or just asking to do him a favor. Moreover, this even provides a sense of mutual respect and friendliness. Besides, all of us need to feel like we are important and that someone is there to listen to us.

2. Focus

Focus is another important element of conversation and communication as a whole. In a conversation it is sometimes easy to tell the difference between an individual who is in the moment with his heart versus someone who is thinking of something else. Ever felt like you need to rush through your talk when chatting with someone? If you did, then this is because that person is just not listening properly to you and has something else on mind.

Did it ever happen to you that you are talking to someone, and suddenly you get this unrelated question out of the blue? That is the obvious sign that the person was not listening to you at all. Maybe you did the same to someone else? However, with others you might feel like you have all the time in the world and that they are willing to listen to every single word you have to say. They even sometimes elaborate on certain concepts to hear more from you. These individuals make you feel like you are the center of their attention, which is a splendid feeling.

3. Not Interrupting

One of the most annoying and irritating feelings in life is when you are trying to get a point across and the other person just constantly interrupts and interrupts. Interrupting the speaker before he finishes his sentence or idea causes the focus to shift to you. It is like telling the other person that your ideas are more important. I mean do you not think that it is rude? It is certainly rude to interrupt and once someone presents themselves as rude, they lose respect from other people. Besides, one of these interruptions can turn into a long-headed argument and fight you could avoid.

So, do not interrupt the other person the same way you would not like the other person to interrupt you. Often what happens is when two people are talking on the phone and engage in a big fight and start raising their voices, this initiates interruptions. However, it is this moment that is the true test, where even in this case people should respect each other and not interrupt. Another negative aspect of interruption is that once someone is interruption he often loses his train of thoughts. This tends to cause the speaker to need more time to get his point across as he needs some time to regain his thoughts.

4. Finish Off Sentences When Appropriate

What do I mean by finishing off sentences only when appropriate? I am talking about when you are chatting with someone and he gets caught up in a sentence and you are able to finish it off for him. This is not to be done often though, because there is a fine line between adding to the conversation and interrupting. A good listener will not try to push his story through, but only help you when are speechless or lost in words.

When done properly, this shows the other person that you are indeed listening to them and are on the same page as them. As a result, the other person would really appreciate the effort you are making and respect that you are really listening to every word he is saying. Try it out and see the results.

5. Validation

Validation is essential in our lives as it is an indication that we are doing things correctly. For instance, studying consistently for a chapter test in math is really good. Moreover, what is even better is getting back that test paper with all the anticipation and suspense associated, to notice that you achieved a 95%. As soon as your mind processes this information, your body jumps out of joy and is overwhelmingly happy. This is one form of validation of our hard work and effort.

Now moving on to communication, telling a speaker that you comprehend what they are saying and understand why they reacted the way they did or saw something in a certain way is confirmation of their intelligence. On the contrary, if you do not understand, do not blame the speaker telling them that they are talking nonsense and they are wrong. Maybe try saying, “So what you are saying is …..” In reality, you are asking them to repeat what they are saying in a polite, indirect way.
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Thursday 28 May 2015

De Laurentiis: I'll get Benitez a good contract for Real Madrid!

The Spanish coach is set to take charge at the
Santiago Bernabeu and the film producer has
jokingly offered to represent him.
Napoli president Aurelio De Laurentiis has jokingly
offered to negotiate with Real Madrid on Rafael
Benitez's behalf.
Benitez announced on Thursday that he will be
standing down as Partenopei boss after the final
round of the Serie A season on Sunday, and the
Spaniard is expected to replace the sacked Carlo
Ancelotti at the Santiago Bernabeu.
De Laurentiis refused to confirm that Benitez is
bound for Madrid but he did offer to represent his
outgoing coach in any potential contract talks.
"Would I recommend Benitez to Florentino Perez?
I would recommend him to every club president
but Perez doesn't need my advice," the Napoli
supremo told reporters at a press conference.
"But if Rafa does join Madrid, it will be a
confirmation that my choice of coach two years
ago was the right one. I hope Florentino gives
Rafa a good contract. I could help Rafa with that
if he wants! It would be a good contract for sure!"
De Laurentiis had hoped to persuade Benitez, who
led Napoli to Coppa Italia glory last year before
lifting the Supercoppa Italiana this season, to
spend another season at the San Paolo.
However, the film producer insisted that he is not
in the least bit upset by the 55-year-old's
decision to depart.
"I thank Rafa Benitez for his work over the past
two years," De Laurentiis added. "He won me over
immediately in London two years ago and he has
since vindicated that positive impression. I had
already understood that this would be his final
season with us because he had wanted to be
closer to his family. His contract was for two
years with the option of a third but he gave me a
reason for this so I wish him good luck.
"Two years ago we were 46th in the UEFA club
rankings but now we're 20th, ahead of many big
teams. In the last two years we have been the
only Italian team other than Juve to have won
titles, lifting two trophies thanks to Rafa. Next
season we will be the only Italian team to have
competed in UEFA competition for the sixth
successive year. We are strong, healthy and in
good shape. I'm very happy to have had Rafa. He
has grown the culture of this club."

FA Cup Preview: Arsenal - Asto Villa

After keeping Aston Villa in the Premier League,
Tim Sherwood shifts his focus to lifting the FA
Cup in Saturday's final against Arsenal.
Tim Sherwood believes all the pressure will be o
Arsenal when he leads his Aston Villa side out at
Wembley in the FA Cup final.
Arsenal lifted the trophy last season with a 3-2
win over Hull City after extra time, and will start
Saturday's game as favourites having finished
third in the Premier League.
Villa, by contrast, finished one place above the
relegation zone, with Sherwood's appointment in
February proving crucial to the club securing
survival.
A rejuventated Villa upset the odds by beating
Liverpool 2-1 in their semifinal last month, and
the former Tottenham boss sees no reason why
his side cannot repeat the feat this weekend.
"To be part of an FA Cup final is a fantastic
achievement for this football club. I'm very
proud," said Sherwood. "The pressure is on
Arsenal. It's a one-off game and form goes out
the window. They've been there and done it
before. We're not going there to make up the
numbers. The boys performed in the semifinal. I
hope we can do the same. I know what the boys
are capable of in one-off games. On big occasion
they've produced the goods and we need to do it
one more time."
Sherwood added: "I believe we're going to get a
performance like we put in against Liverpool. We
intend to take the game to them.
"The boys know they can make history. Someone
can be a hero in there. It's an opportunity for
everyone to write the history books again."
Villa has gone 58 years without lifting the FA Cup
while its most recent final appearance in 2000 -
the last final at the old Wembley - ended in a 1-
defeat to Chelsea.
Arsenal, meanwhile, is bidding to become the
most successful side in the competition's history
with its 11 victories to date matched only by
Manchester United.
Manager Arsene Wenger has overseen five of
those triumphs, and the Frenchman gave little
away when discussing his likely team selection
for Saturday's meeting.
"It is important to focus as a whole squad on
winning the trophy," said Wenger. "Most of the
time the heroes are the people who come on in a
FA Cup final - they make the difference. That's
why it is important as a reward for the whole
team who have fought very hard the whole
season to get there. Let's deal with it as a whol
squad. I have some big selection decisions to
make on Saturday. Even to leave some top
internationals out of the squad shows that we
have a very big squad."
Wenger added: "What is important is that we do
not make too many individual cases before the
cup final. It's the whole team who can win it.
"I don't know who will start yet and it’s not
important because it's just on the day in the FA
Cup final. What is important is that you bring the
trophy back. It's always a concern for the whole
squad."
Wenger will be without striker Danny Welbeck,
who is suffering with a knee injury, although
Mathieu Debuchy (hamstring) and Mikel Arteta
(ankle) are in contention.
For Villa, Shay Given and Kieran Richardson are
back in training after respective groin and calf
problems while Jores Okore (knee) and Libor
Kozak (back) are doubtful.

Ancelotti mulling AC Milan offer

AC Milan are bidding to lure back Carlo Ancelotti,
who was sacked this week by Spanish giants Real
Madrid, the Italian club’s vice-president Adriano
Galliani confirmed on Thursday.
Ancelotti lead Real to their 10th elite European
title last season but was sacked after the club
finished runners-up to Barcelona in La Liga and
lost to Juventus in the semi-finals of this year’s
Champions League.
“The deadline for a reply is Wednesday, June 3,”
Galliani told journalists after meeting with the 55-
year-old Italian at Madrid’s Wellington Hotel.
“I’ll make my decision on Wednesday,” Ancelotti
confirmed, adding that he had “always gotten on
well with Galliani”.
As for the “sabbatical year” that Ancelotti had
said he was considering after his sacking, he
added simply “we’ll see”.
“Carlo wanted to take a year out, we’re hoping to
convince him to accept Milan,” said Galliani,
whose side are tenth in the Serie A with one
match left this season.
“He still has some days to think about it, he told
me the chances were 50-50.”
The affable coach had said last weekend he
would either stay at Real Madrid or take a year
off to undergo surgery on a worsening and urgent
health problem.
“I must have a back operation because of spinal
stenosis that for some time creates a tingle in my
hands,” he told Italian newspaper Il Giornale.
“I don’t know how long the period of recovery will
be,” he added. “But I can assure you that I’ve had
plenty of (job) offers from Italy, England,
Germany.”
Ancelotti coached AC Milan from 2001 to 2009,
winning the Serie A in 2004 and two Champions
League titles in 2003 and 2007, he also won the
old European Cup twice as a player with AC Milan
in 1989 and 1990.

Ancelotti to discuss future in coming days
In "Sport"
Ancelotti doesn't fear Chelsea axe
CHELSEA'S manager, Carlo Ancelotti, has
insisted that he does not fear being sacked
by Blues' owner, Roman Abramovich, despite
his team's recent struggles. Ancelotti's side
heads into the Christmas programme on the
back of a disappointing run of just one win in
the last six matches. Exiting the League
Cup…
In "Abroad"
Ancelotti plans Chelsea's dominance
COACH Carlo Ancelotti plans to establish
Chelsea as the leading force in English
football after winning the Premier League in
his first season at the club.The Blues last
lifted the title in 2006 but thrashed Wigan
8-0 on Sunday to wrest it from Manchester
United. The 50-year-old Ancelotti, who joined

Wednesday 27 May 2015

10 things that happened to Nigeria

1. Buhari Moves To Reduce Cost Of
Governance
The incoming administration of Muhammadu
Buhari, will likely stick to just 19 ministers in
its cabinet. The report stated that most of the
ministers that will be appointed will be
ministers of state in contrast to what is
obtainable in the current administration of
President Goodluck Jonathan.
2. Group Files Suit To Stop Buhari’s May 29
Inauguration
A Nigerian group has called on Abuja Federal
High Court to stop the process.
Meanwhile, the plaintiff in the case seeking to
stop Muhammadu Buhari’s inauguration failed
to appear in court so the case suffered set
back.
3. Nigerian Army Maltreats Sacked Soldiers
Agunloye Sunday claimed that the accusations
against him and 199 others were “untrue, false
and malicious” and that the arms given for
them were outdated.
4. GMB Speaks About Zoning Of Key Positions
Muhammadu Buhari has reassured his desire
to work with any chief of the National
Assembly and Senate that will emerge.
5. Jonathan Dares Buhari
At a valedictory cabinet meeting held today,
Jonathan views an attempt to single out his
administration for probe as a move to “witch
hunt’’ him and he called on Buhari not only to
probe his administration but do the same for
the past governments.
6. GEJ Presides Over His Final FEC Meeting
The incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan
today May 27, attends his last Federal
Executive Council (FEC) meeting as the
Nigeria’s President.
7. Boko Haram Is Controlled By Foreigners
Video footage seized by Nigeria’s military in
captured Boko Haram camp gives clear
evidence that foreigners hold top power
positions within notoriously known Nigerian
militant group.
8. Goodluck Jonathan Signs Six Bills Into Law
Reuben Abati, the presidential spokesman, has
on on Wednesday, taken to Twitter to provide
the updates on GEJ’s current activity in the
office.
9. Court Spares Kashamu From ‘Unlawful’
Extradition
According to decision ruled by Justice Okon
Abang of the Federal High court in Lagos,
NDELA latest moves to extradite Kashamu to
the United States are unlawful.
10. Sevilla Wins Europa League
The match was played at the Stadion
Narodowy in Warsaw, Poland between
Ukrainian side Dnipro Dnipropetrovsk and the
2014 winners, Spanish side Sevilla. Dnipro
plays very good.

Colonial Nigeria


Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria
British colony


1914–1960 →
Flag of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria
Anthem
God Save the King /God Save the Queen

British possessions in Africa (pink)
1914
Capital Lagos
Languages English
Government British Crown colony
High Commissioner /
Governor
- 1914–1919 Sir Frederick John
Dealtry Lugard
- 1948–1954 Sir John Stuart
Macpherson

History
- Established 1 January 1914
- Disestablished 1 October 1960
Currency British West African
pound (1914–1958)
Nigerian Pound (from
1958)

Colonial Nigeria refers to the area of West
Africa, which became the modern day Nigeria ,
during the time British rule in the 19th and
20th centuries. British influence began with
prohibition of slave trade to British subjects in
1807. The resulting collapse of African slave
trade led to the decline and eventual collapse
of the Edo Empire . Britain annexed Lagos in
1861 and established the Oil River Protectorate
in 1884. British influence in the Niger area
increased gradually over the 19th century, but
Britain did not effectively occupy the area until
1885. Other European powers acknowledged
Britain's power over the area in the 1885
Berlin Conference.
From 1886–1899, much of the country was
ruled by Royal Niger Company , authorized by
charter, and governed by George Taubman
Goldie . In 1900, the Southern Nigeria
Protectorate and Northern Nigeria Protectorate
passed from company hands to the Crown. At
the urging of governor Frederick Lugard, the
two territories were amalgamated as the
Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria , while
maintaining considerable regional autonomy
among the three major regions. Progressive
constitutions after World War II provided for
increasing representation and electoral
government by Nigerians. The colonial period
proper in Nigeria lasted from 1900 to 1960,
after which Nigeria gained its independence.

Overview

Through a progressive sequence of regimes,
the British imposed autocratic rule on the area
of West Africa which came to be known as
Nigeria. [1] Administration and military control
of the territory was done primarily by white
Britishers, both in London and in Nigeria. [2]
Following military conquest, the British
imposed an economic system designed to
profit from African labour. The essential basis
of this system was money—specifically, British
money—which could be demanded through
taxation, paid to cooperative natives, and
levied as a fine. [3][4]
The amalgamation of different ethnic and
religious groups into one federation created
internal tension which persists in Nigeria to the
present day.[5]

Origins of British influence

In the 1700s, the British Empire and other
European powers had settlements and forts in
West Africa but had not yet established the
full-scale plantation colonies which existed in
Americas. Adam Smith wrote in 1776 that the
African societies were better established and
more populous than those of the Americas,
thus creating a more formidable barrier to
European expansion. [6][7]
Earlier elements related to this were its
founding of the colony at Sierra Leone in 1787
as a refuge for freed slaves, the independent
missionary movement intended to bring
Christianity to Edo Empire, and programs of
exploration sponsored by learned societies and
scientific groups, such as the London-based
African Association .
Local leaders, cognizant of the situation in the
West Indies, India, and elsewhere, recognized
the risks of British expansion. A chief of Bonny
in 1860 explained that he refused a British
treaty due to the tendency to "induce the
Chiefs to sign a treaty whose meaning they did
not understand, and then seize upon the
country." [8]

    Slave trade and abolition
 
Map of Negroland and Guinea
including the Slave Coast , 1736, by
London cartographer Hermann Moll
European slave trading from West Africa began
before 1650, with people taken at a rate of
about 3,000 per year. This rate rose to 20,000
per year in the last quarter of the century. The
slave trade was heaviest in the period 1700–
1850, with an average of 76,000 people taken
from Africa each year between 1783 and 1792.
At first, the trade centered around West Central
Africa, now the Congo. But in the 1700s, the
Bight of Benin (also known as the Slave
Coast ) became the next most important hub.
Ouidah (now part of Benin) and Lagos were
the major ports in Biafra. From 1790–1807,
predominantly British slave traders purchased
1000–2000 slaves each year in Lagos alone.
The trade subsequently continued under the
Portuguese. In the Bight of Biafra , the major
ports were Old Calabar ( Akwa Akpa), Bonny ,
and New Calabar .[9] Starting in 1740, the
British were the primary European slave
trafficker from this area. [6] In 1767, British
traders facilitated a notorious massacre
hundreds of people at Calabar after inviting
them onto their ships, ostensibly to settle a
local dispute. [10]
In 1807 the Parliament of the United Kingdom
enacted the Slave Trade Act , prohibiting British
subjects from participating in the slave trade.
Britain subsequently lobbied other European
powers to stop the slave trade as well. It
made anti-slavery treaties with West African
powers, which it enforced militarily. Some of
the treaties contained prohibitions on
diplomacy conducted without British
permission, or other promises to abide by
British rule. [11] This scenario provided an
opportunity for naval expeditions and
reconnaissance throughout the region. Britain
also annexed Freetown in Sierra Leone,
declaring it a Crown Colony in 1808. [12]
The decrease in trade indirectly led to the
collapse of Edo Empire . Britain withdrew from
the slave trade when it was the major
transporter of slaves to the Americas. The
French had abolished slavery following the
French Revolution, although it briefly re-
established it in its Caribbean colonies under
Napoleon. France sold Louisiana to the United
States in 1803, the same year that it gave up
on trying to regain Saint-Dominque. By the end
of the Napoleonic Wars , it ended slavery in its
possessions. Between them, the French and
the British had purchased a majority of the
slaves sold from the ports of Edo. The
economy suffered from the decline in the slave
trade, although considerable smuggling of
slaves to the Americans continued for years.
Lagos became a major slave port in the late
1700s and into the 1850s. Much of the human
trafficking which occurred there was nominally
illegal, and records from this time and place
are not comprehensive. According to the
Trans-Atlantic Slave Voyage Database,
308,800 were sold across the Atlantic from
Lagos in 1776–1850. British and French
traders did a large share of this business until
1807, when they were replaced by Portuguese
and Spanish. By 1826–1850 the British navy
was interfering significantly with Lagos slave
exports. [13]
Whether British conquest of Nigeria resulted
from a benevolent motive to end slavery, or
more instrumental motives of wealth and
power, remains a topic of dispute between
African and European historians.[14] Many
locals remained unconvinced of the Crown's
authority to completely reverse the legal and
moral attributes of a social institution through
fiat. [15] Regardless, slavery had decimated the
population and fueled militarization and chaos,
thereby paving the way for more aggressive
colonisation. [13][16]
  
Missionaries

Portuguese Roman Catholic priests who
accompanied traders and officials to the West
African coast introduced Christianity to Edo,
Benin Empire in the fifteenth century. Several
churches were built to serve the Edo
community and a small number of African
converts. When direct Portuguese contacts in
the region were withdrawn, however, the
influence of the Catholic missionaries waned.
By the eighteenth century, evidence of
Christianity had disappeared.
Although churchmen in Britain had been
influential in the drive to abolish the slave
trade, significant missionary activity for Africa
did not develop until the 1840s. For some
time, missionaries operated in the area
between Lagos and Ibadan. The first missions
were opened by the Church of England 's
Church Missionary Society (CMS). Other
Protestant denominations from Britain,
Canada, and the United States also opened
missions and, in the 1860s, Roman Catholic
religious orders established missions.
Protestant missionaries tended to divide the
country into spheres of activity to avoid
competition with each other, and Catholic
missions similarly avoided duplication of effort
among the several religious orders working
there. Catholic missionaries were particularly
active among the Igbo ; the CMS worked
among the Yoruba .
The CMS initially promoted Africans to
responsible positions in the mission field; for
instance, they appointed Samuel Ajayi
Crowther as the first Anglican bishop of the
Niger. Crowther, a liberated Yoruba slave, had
been educated in Sierra Leone and in Britain,
where he was ordained before returning to his
homeland with the first group of CMS
missionaries. The Anglicans and other religious
groups had a conscious "native church" policy
to develop indigenous ecclesiastical
institutions to become independent of
Europeans. Crowther was succeeded as bishop
by a British cleric. In the long term, the
acceptance of Christianity by large numbers of
Nigerians depended on the various
denominations adapting to local conditions.
They selected an increasingly high proportion
of African clergy for the missions.
In large measure, European missionaries
assumed the value of colonial rule in terms of
promoting education, health and welfare
measures, so they effectively reinforced
colonial policy. Some African Christian
communities formed their own independent
churches.

(Note: All of this section to this point is from
Nigeria: A Country Study (1991) prepared by
staff of the Library of Congress of the United
States. [17]
The missionaries gained in power throughout
the 1800s. They caused major transformations
in traditional society as they eroded the
religious institutions such as human sacrifice,
infanticide, and secret societies, which had
formerly played a role in political authority and
community life. [18]

Commerce

The principal commodities of legitimate trade
were palm oil and palm kernels, which were
used in Europe to make soap and as lubricants
for machinery, before petroleum products were
developed for that purpose. Although this trade
grew to significant proportions—palm oil
exports alone were worth £1 billion a year by
1840—it was concentrated near the coast,
where palm trees grew in abundance.
Gradually, however, the trade forced major
economic and social changes in the interior,
although it hardly undermined slavery and the
slave trade. The incidence of slavery in local
societies increased.
Initially most palm oil (and later kernels) came
from Igboland, where palm trees formed a
canopy over the densely inhabited areas of the
Ngwa, Nri Kingdom , Awka, and other Igbo
peoples. Palm oil was used locally for cooking,
the kernels were a source for food, trees were
tapped for palm wine, and the fronds were
used for building material. It was a relatively
simple adjustment for many Igbo families to
transport the oil to rivers and streams that led
to the Niger Delta for sale to European
merchants. The rapid expansion in exports,
especially after 1830, occurred precisely at the
time slave exports collapsed. The Igbo
redirected slaves into the domestic economy,
especially to grow the staple food crop, yams,
in northern Igboland for marketing throughout
the palm-tree belt. As before, Aro merchants
dominated trade in the hinterland, including
palm products to the coast and the sale of
slaves within Igboland.
From 1815–1840, palm oil exports increased
by a factor of 25, from 800 to 20,000 tons per
year. British merchants led the trade in palm
oil, while the Portuguese and others continued
the slave trade. [6] Much of this oil was sold
elsewhere in the British Empire. [19] To produce
all this oil, the economy of the southern region
crossed over from mostly subsistence to the
production of palm oil as a cash crop .[20]
The Niger Delta and Calabar , which once had
been known for the export of slaves, became
notable for the export of palm oil. The Delta
streams were called "oil rivers." The basic
economic units in each town were "houses,"
family-operated entities that engendered
loyalty for its employees. A "house" included
the extended family of the trader, including
retainers and slaves. As its head, the master
trader taxed other traders who were members
of his "house;" he maintained a war vessel, a
large dugout canoe that could hold several
tons of cargo and dozens of crew, for the
defense of the harbor. Whenever a trader had
become successful enough to keep a war
canoe, he was expected to form his own
"house". Economic competition among these
"houses" was so fierce that trade often erupted
into armed battle between the crews of the
large canoes.

Because of the hazards of climate and tropical
diseases for Europeans and the absence of any
centralized authorities on the mainland
responsive to their interests, European
merchants moored their ships outside harbours
or in the delta, and used the ships as trading
stations and warehouses. In time they built
depots onshore and eventually moved up the
Niger River to establish stations in the interior.
An example was that at Onitsha, where they
could bargain directly with local suppliers and
purchase products likely to turn a profit.
Some European traders switched to legitimate
business only when the commerce in slaves
became too hazardous. The traders suffered
from the risks of their position and believed
they were at the mercy of the coastal rulers,
whom they considered unpredictable.
Accordingly, as the volume of trade increased,
merchants requested that the British
government appoint a consul to cover the
region. Consequently in 1849, John Beecroft
was accredited as consul for the bights of
Benin and Biafra, a jurisdiction stretching from
Dahomey to Cameroon . Beecroft was the
British representative to Fernando Po, where
the prevention squadron of the British Royal
Navy was stationed.
In 1850, the British created a "Court of Equity"
at Bonny, overseen by Beecroft, which would
deal with trade disputes. Another court was
established in 1856 at Calabar, based on an
agreement with local Efik traders which
prohibited them from interfering with British
merchants. These courts contained majorities
British members and represented a new level of
presumptive British sovereignty in the Bight of
Biafra. [11]
West Africa also bought British exports,
supplying 30–40% of the demand for British
cotton during the Industrial Revolution of
1750–1790. [19]

Exploration

At the same time, the British scientists were
interested in exploring the course and related
settlements along the Niger River. The delta
masked the mouth of the great river, and for
centuries Nigerians chose not to tell Europeans
the secrets of the interior. In 1794 the African
Association in Great Britain commissioned
Mungo Park, an intrepid Scottish physician and
naturalist, to search for the headwaters of the
Niger and follow the river downstream. Park
reached the upper Niger the next year by
traveling inland from the Gambia River.
Although he reported on the eastward flow of
the Niger, he was forced to turn back when his
equipment was lost to Muslim Arab slave
traders. In 1805 he set out on a second
expedition, sponsored by the British
government, to follow the Niger to the sea. His
mission failed, but Park and his party covered
more than 1,500 kilometers, passing through
the western portions of the Sokoto Caliphate,
before drowning when their boats overturned in
rapids near Bussa.
On a subsequent expedition to the Sokoto
Caliphate , Hugh Clapperton learned about the
mouth of the Niger River, where it reached the
sea, but he died before confirming it. His
servant, Richard Lander, and Lander's brother
John were the ones to demonstrate that the
Niger flowed into the sea. The Lander brothers
were seized by slave traders in the interior and
sold down the river to a waiting European
ship.
Initial British attempts to open trade with the
interior by way of the Niger could not
overcome climate and diseases such as
malaria. A third of the people associated with
an 1842 riverine expedition died. In the 1850s,
the benefits of quinine had been found to
combat malaria, and aided by the medicine, a
Liverpool merchant, Macgregor Laird, opened
the river. Laird's efforts were stimulated by
the detailed reports of a pioneer German
explorer, Heinrich Barth, who traveled through
much of Borno and the Sokoto Caliphate,
where he recorded information about the
region's geography, economy, and inhabitants.

First colonial claims
Lagos Colony

Flag of the Lagos Colony (1886-1906)
As part of an anti-slavery campaign and a
pretext for making inroads into Lagos, Britain
bombarded Lagos in November 1851, ousted
the pro-slavery Oba Kosoko and established a
treaty with the newly installed Oba Akitoye
who was more amenable. Lagos was annexed
as a Crown Colony in 1861 via the Lagos
Treaty of Cession .
British expansion accelerated in the last
decades of the nineteenth century. The early
history of Lagos Colony was one of repeated
attempts to end the Yoruba wars. In the face
of threats to the divided Yoruba states from
Dahomey and the Sokoto Caliphate, as
represented by the emirate of Ilorin , the British
governor—assisted by the CMS—succeeded in
imposing peace settlements on the interior.
Colonial Lagos was a busy, cosmopolitan port.
Its architecture was in both Victorian and
Brazilian style, as many of the black elite were
English-speakers from Sierra Leone and
freedmen repatriated from Brazil and Cuba. Its
residents were employed in official capacities
and were active in business. Africans also
were represented on the Lagos Legislative
Council, a largely appointed assembly. The
Colony was ultimately governed by the British
Colonial Office in London. [21]
Captain John Glover, the colony's
administrator, created a militia of Hausa
troops in 1861. This became the Lagos
Constabulary, and subsequently the Nigerian
Police Force .[22]
In 1880, the British government and traders
demonetized the Maria Theresa dollar , to the
considerable dismay of its local holders, in
favor of the pound. [3] In 1891, the African
Banking Corporation founded the Bank of
British West Africa in Lagos. [2

Oil Rivers Protectorate

Queen Victoria on a stamp of the Niger
Coast Protectorate of 1894.
After the Berlin Conference of 1884, Britain
announced formation of the Oil Rivers
Protectorate , which included the Niger Delta
and extended eastward to Calabar, where the
British consulate general was relocated from
Fernando Po. The protectorate was organized
to control and develop trade coming down the
Niger. Vice consuls were assigned to ports
that already had concluded treaties of
cooperation with the Foreign Office. Local
rulers continued to administer their territories,
but consular authorities assumed jurisdiction
for the equity courts established earlier by the
foreign mercantile communities. A
constabulary force was raised and used to
pacify the coastal area.
In 1894 the territory was redesignated the
Niger Coast Protectorate and was expanded to
include the region from Calabar to Lagos
Colony and Protectorate, including the
hinterland, and northward up the Niger River
as far as Lokoja, the headquarters of the Royal
Niger Company. As a protectorate, it did not
have the status of a colony, so its officials
were appointed by the Foreign Office and not
by the Colonial Office. [21]
In 1891, the Consulate established the Niger
Coast Protectorate Force or "Oil Rivers
Irregulars". [22]
Royal Niger Company
Ensign of the Royal Niger Company
(1888-1899)
British stamps used in 1898 at Akassa
by the Royal Niger Company.
The legitimate trade in commodities attracted
a number of rough-hewn British merchants to
the Niger River , as well as some men who had
been formerly engaged in the slave trade but
who now changed their line of wares. The
large companies that subsequently opened
depots in the delta cities and in Lagos were as
ruthlessly competitive as the delta towns
themselves and frequently used force to
compel potential suppliers to agree to
contracts and to meet their demands. To some
extent, competition amongst these companies
undermined their collective position vis-a-vis
local merchants.
In the 1870s, therefore, George Taubman
Goldie began amalgamating companies into
the United African Company, soon renamed the
National African Company. [11]
The Royal Niger Company established its
headquarters far inland at Lokoja, which was
the main trading port of the company, [24] from
where it pretended to assume responsibility for
the administration of areas along the Niger
and Benue rivers where it maintained depots.
It soon gained a virtual monopoly over trade
along the River [3]
The company interfered in the territory along
the Niger and the Benue, sometimes becoming
embroiled in serious conflicts when its British-
led native constabulary intercepted slave raids
or attempted to protect trade routes. The
company negotiated treaties with Sokoto,
Gwandu, and Nupe that were interpreted as
guaranteeing exclusive access to trade in
return for the payment of annual tribute.
Officials of the Sokoto Caliphate considered
these treaties quite differently; from their
perspective, the British were granted only
extraterritorial rights that did not prevent
similar arrangements with the Germans and
the French and certainly did not surrender
sovereignty.
Even before gaining its charter, the Company
signed treaties with local leaders which
granted it broad sovereign powers. One 1885
treaty read:
The Company considered itself the sole
legitimate government of the area, with
executive, legislative, and judicial powers all
subordinate to the rule of a Council created by
the Company Board of Directors in London.
The Council was headed by a Governor. The
Deputy Governor served as Political
Administrator for company's territory, and
appointed three officials in Nigeria to carry out
the work of administration. These were the
Agent General, the Senior Judicial Officer, and
the Commandant of the Constabulary. [25]
However, the Company did accept that local
emirs could act as partners in governance and
trade. It therefore hired native intermediaries
who could conduct diplomacy, trade, and
intelligence work in the local area. [26]
The Company, as was common among
European businesses in Africa, paid its native
workers in barter. At the turn of the century,
top wages were four bags of salt (company
retail price, 3s 9d) for a month of work. [4]
Trade was also conducted through a
mechanism of barter and credit. Goods were
made available on credit to African middlemen,
who were expected to trade them at a pre-
arranged price and deliver the proceeds to the
Company. The Company's major imports to
the area included gin and low-quality firearms.
[3]
By the 1880s, the National African Company
became the dominant commercial power,
increasing from 19 to 39 stations between
1882 and 1993. In 1886, Taubman secured a
Royal Charter and his company became the
Royal Niger Company. The Charter allowed the
Company to collect customs and make treaties
with local leaders.[4]
Under Goldie's direction, the Royal Niger
Company was instrumental in depriving France
and Germany of access to the region.
Consequently, he may well deserve the epithet
"father of Nigeria," which historians accorded
him. He definitely laid the basis for British
claims.
The Royal Niger Company had its own armed
forces. [22] This included a river fleet which it
used for retalitatory attacked on uncooperative
villages. [3]
Britain's imperialistic posture became more
aggressive towards the end of the century. The
appointment of Joseph Chamberlain as
Colonial Secretary in 1895 especially marked a
shift towards new territorial ambitions of the
British Empire. [27] Economically, local colonial
administrators also pushed for the imposition
of British colonial rule, believing that trade and
taxation conducted in British pounds would
prove far more lucrative than a barter trade
which yielded only inconsistent customs
duties. [3]
Military conquest
The British led a series of military campaigns
to enlarge its sphere of influence and expand
its commercial opportunities. Most of the
fighting was done by Hausa soldiers, recruited
to fight against other groups. The superior
weapons, tactics, and political unity of the
British are commonly given as reasons for their
decisive ultimate victory. [28][29]
In 1892 the British forces set out to fight the
Ijebu Kingdom, which had resisted missionaries
and foreign traders. The legal justification for
this campaign was a treaty signed in 1886,
when the British had interceded as
peacemakers to end the Ekitiparapo war, which
imposed free trade requirements and mandated
that all parties continue to use British
channels for diplomacy. [11] Although the Ijebu
had some weapons they were wiped out by
British machine guns called Maxim guns. With
this victory, the British went on to conquer the
rest of Yorubaland, which had also been
weakened by sixteen years of civil war. [30] By
1893, most of the other political entities in
Yorubaland recognized the practical necessity
signing another treaty with the British, this one
explicitly joining them with the protectorate of
Lagos. [11][31]
King Koko in His War Canoe, London Daily
Graphic , March 30, 1985; depicting King
Frederick William Koko —onetime antagonist to
the Royal Niger Company
In 1896–1897 the forces of the Niger Coast
Protectorate fought with the remnants of the
Benin Empire. Following the defeat of an
unsuccessful foray by Consul General James
R. Phillips, a larger retaliatory force captured
Benin City and drove Ovonramwen , the Oba of
Benin, into exile.[32]
The British had difficulty conquering Igboland,
which lacked central political organization. In
the name of liberating the Igbos from the Aro
Confederacy, the British launched the Anglo-
Aro War of 1901–1902. Despite conquering
villages by burning houses and crops,
continual political control over the Igbo
remained elusive. [33][34] The British forces
began annual pacification missions to convince
the locals of British supremacy. [35]
A campaign against the Sokoto Caliphate
began in 1900 with the creation of the
Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, under the
direction of Governor Lugard. The British
captured Kano in 1903. Deadly battles broke
out sporadically through 1906. [36] Lugard was
slow to describe these excursions to the
Colonial Office, which apparently learned of
preparations to attack Kano from the
newspapers in December 1902. Not wishing to
appear out of control or weak, they approved
the expedition (two days after it began) on
January 19, 1903. [37] In general the Colonial
Office allowed Lugard's expeditions to
continue because they were framed as
retaliatory and, as Olivier commented in 1906,
"If the millions of people [in Nigeria] who do
not want us there once get the notion that our
people can be killed with impunity they will not
be slow to attempt it." [38]
Lugard informed the leaders of conquered
Sokoto :
Political administration under
the Crown
Further information: Northern Nigeria
Protectorate , Southern Nigeria Protectorate and
Provinces of Nigeria
The British Colonial Office in
Westminster , created in the 1860s
by architect George Gilbert Scott ;
illustrated in 1875
Contemporary photograph of the
same building, now housing the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Concrete plans for transition to Crown rule—
direct control by the British government—
apparently began in 1897. In May of this year,
Herbert J. Read published a Memorandum on
British possessions in West Africa, which
remarked upon the "inconvenient and
unscientific boundaries" between Lagos
Colony, the Niger Coast Protectorate, and the
Royal Niger Company. Read suggested they be
merged, and more use made of Nigeria's
natural resources[40] In the same year, the
British created the Royal West African Frontier
Force (RWAFF or WAFF), under the leadership
of Colonel Frederick Lugard. In one year,
Lugard recruited 2600 troops, evenly split
between Hausa and Yoruba. The officers of the
RWAFF were British. The operations of this
force are still not fully known due to a policy
of strict secrecy mandated by the British
government. [41]
Guidelines for running the Nigerian colony were
established in 1898 by the Niger Committee,
chaired by the Earl of Selborne , in 1898. The
British finalized the border between Nigeria
and French West Africa with the Anglo-French
Convention of 1898 . [42]
The territory of the Royal Niger Company
became the Northern Nigeria Protectorate , and
the Company itself became a private
corporation which continued to do business in
Nigeria. The Company received £865,000
compensation for the loss of its Charter. It
continued to enjoy special privileges and
maintained a de facto monopoly over
commerce. Under Lugard from 1900–1906, the
Protectorate consolidated political control over
the area through military conquest and
initiated the use of British currency in
substitute for barter. [3][4]
In 1900, the British government assumed
control of the Southern and Northern
Protectorates, both of which were ultimately
governed by the Colonial Office at Whitehall .
The staff of this office came primarily from the
British upper middle class—i.e., university-
educated men, primarily not nobility, with
fathers in well-respected professions. [43] The
first five heads of the Nigeria Department
(1898–1914) were Reginald Antrobus, William
Mercer, William Baillie Hamilton, Sydney
Olivier , and Charles Strachey. [44] Olivier was a
member of the Fabian Society and a friend of
George Bernard Shaw. [45]
Under the Colonial Office was the Governor,
who managed administration of his colony and
held powers of emergency rule. The Colonial
Office could veto or revise his policies. The
seven men who governed Northern Nigeria,
Southern Nigeria, and Lagos through 1914
were Henry McCallum , William MacGregor,
Walter Egerton , Ralph Moor, Percy Girouard ,
Hesketh Bell, and Frederick Lugard. Most of
these came from military backgrounds. All
were knighted. [46]
Undated British archival photo of locomotive in
Nigeria
Walter Egerton's sixfold agenda for 1908, as
detailed on November 29, 1907, in a telegram
to the Colonial Office, is representative of
British priorities. [47]
Egerton also supervised improvements to the
Lagos harbour and extension of the local
telegraph network. [47]
From 1895–1900, a railway was constructed
running from Lagos to Ibadan ; it opened in
March 1901. This line was extended to
Oshogbo, 62 miles away, in 1905–1907, and to
Zungeru and Minna in 1908–1911. Its final leg
enabled it to meet another line, constructed
1907–1911, running from Baro, through
Minnia, to Kano. [48]
Some of these public work projects were
accomplished with the help of forced labour,
referred to as "Political Labour". Village Heads
were paid 10 shillings for conscripts, and fined
£50 if they failed to supply. Individuals could
be fined or jailed for refusing to comply.[4]
Frederick Lugard , who was appointed as High
Commissioner of the Protectorate of Dutch
Geria in 1900 and served until 1906 in his first
term, often has been regarded by the British as
their model colonial administrator. Trained as
an army officer, he had served in India, Egypt,
and East Africa, where he expelled Arab slave
traders from Nyasaland and established the
British presence in Uganda. Joining the Royal
Niger Company in 1894, Lugard was sent to
Borgu to counter inroads made by the French,
and in 1897 he was made responsible for
raising the Royal West African Frontier Force
(RWAFF) from local levies to serve under
British officers.
During his six-year tenure as High
Commissioner, Sir Frederick Lugard (as he
became in 1901) was occupied with
transforming the commercial sphere of
influence inherited from the Royal Niger
Company into a viable territorial unit under
effective British political control. His objective
was to conquer the entire region and to obtain
recognition of the British protectorate by its
indigenous rulers, especially the Fulani emirs of
the Sokoto Caliphate . Lugard's campaign
systematically subdued local resistance, using
armed force when diplomatic measures failed.
Borno capitulated without a fight, but in 1903
Lugard's RWAFF mounted assaults on Kano
and Sokoto. From Lugard's point of view,
clear-cut military victories were necessary
because the surrenders of the defeated peoples
weakened resistance elsewhere.
Lugard's success in northern Nigeria has been
attributed to his policy of indirect rule; that is,
he governed the protectorate through the
rulers defeated by the British. If the emirs
accepted British authority, abandoned the slave
trade, and cooperated with British officials in
modernizing their administrations, the colonial
power was willing to confirm them in office.
The emirs retained their caliphate titles but
were responsible to British district officers,
who had final authority. The British High
Commissioners could depose emirs and other
officials if necessary.
A map displaying Southern and Northern
Nigeria, 1914.
Amalgamation of Nigeria was envisioned from
early on in its governance, as is made clear by
the report of the Niger Committee in 1898.
Combining the three jurisdictions would reduce
administrative expenses and facilitate
deployment of resources and money between
the areas. (Specifically it would enable direct
subsidy of the less profitable Northern
jurisdiction.) Antrobus, Fiddes, and Strachey in
the Colonial Office promoted amalgamation,
along with Lugard. [49]
Following the order recommended by the Niger
Committee, the Colonial Office merged Lagos
Colony and the Southern Nigeria Protectorate
on May 1, 1906, forming a larger protectorate
(still called the Southern Nigeria Protectorate)
which spanned the coastline between Dahomey
and Cameroon. [49]
Lugard advocated constantly for unification of
the whole territory, and in August 1911 the
Colonial Office asked Lugard to lead the
amalgamated colony. [50]
In 1912, Lugard returned to Nigeria from his
six-year term as Governor of Hong Kong , to
oversee the merger of the northern and
southern protectorates. On May 9, 1913,
Lugard submitted a formal proposal to the
Colonial Office in which Northern and Southern
provinces would have separate
administrations, under the control of a
"strongly authoritarian" Governor-General. The
Colonial Office approved most of Lugard's
plan, but balked at authorizing him to pass
laws without their approval. [51] John Anderson
diplomatically suggested:
The task of unification was achieved on the
eve of World War I. From January 1914
onwards, the newly united colony and
protectorate was presided over by a proconsul ,
who was entitled the Governor-General of
Nigeria . The militias and RWAFF battalions
were reorganized into the RWAFF Nigeria
Regiment .[52]
Lugard's governmental model for Nigeria was
unique and there was apparently not much
planning for its future development. Colonial
official A. J. Harding commented in 1913:
The Colonial Office accepted Lugard's proposal
that the Governor not be required to stay in-
country full-time; consequently, as Governor,
Lugard spent four months out of the year in
London. This scheme proved unpopular and
confusing to many involved parties and was
phased out. [53]
Yoruba sculpture from colonial period
depicting the British technique of
indirect rule
Emir of Kano, with cavalry,
photographed in 1911
The Protectorate was centrally administered by
the Colonial Civil Service, staffed by Britishers
and Africans called the British Native Staff—
many of whom originated from outside the
territory. Under the Political Department of the
Civil Service were Residents and District
Officers, responsible for overseeing operations
in each region. The Resident also oversaw a
Provincial Court at the region's capital. [54]
Each region also had a Native Administration,
staffed by locals, and possessing a Native
Treasury. The Native Administration was
headed by the traditional rulers —emirs in the
north—and his District Heads, who oversaw a
larger number of Village Heads. Native
Administration was responsible for police,
hospitals, public works, and local courts. The
Colonial Civil Service used intermediaries, as
the Royal Niger Company had, in an expanded
role which included diplomacy, propaganda,
and espionage. [55]
Half of all taxes went to the colonial
government and half went to the Native
Treasury. The Treasury used a planned budget
for payment of staff and development of public
works projects, and therefore could not be
spent at the discretion of the local emir.
Herbert Richmond Palmer developed details of
this model from 1906–1911 as the governor of
Northern Nigeria after Lugard. [56]
In 1916 Lugard formed the Nigerian Council, a
consultative body that brought together six
traditional leaders—including the Sultan of
Sokoto , the Emir of Kano , and the King of
Benin—to represent all parts of the colony. The
council was promoted as a device for allowing
the expression of opinions that could instruct
the Governor-General. In practice, Lugard used
the annual sessions to inform the traditional
leaders of British policy, leaving them with no
functions at the council's meetings except to
listen and to assent.
Unification meant only the loose affiliation of
three distinct regional administrations into
which Nigeria was subdivided—northern,
western, and eastern regions (see fig. 6). Each
was under a lieutenant governor and provided
independent government services. The
governor was, in effect, the coordinator for
virtually autonomous entities that had
overlapping economic interests but little in
common politically or socially. In the Northern
Region, the colonial government took careful
account of Islam and avoided any appearance
of a challenge to traditional values that might
incite resistance to British rule. [57]
This system, in which the structure of authority
focused on the emir to whom obedience was a
mark of religious devotion, did not welcome
change. As the emirs settled more and more
into their role as reliable agents of indirect
rule, colonial authorities were content to
maintain the status quo, particularly in
religious matters. Christian missionaries were
barred, and the limited government efforts in
education were harmonized with Islamic
institutions. [57]
In the south, by contrast, traditional leaders
were employed as vehicles of indirect rule in
EdoLand & Yorubaland, but Christianity and
Western education undermined their sacerdotal
functions. In some instances, however, a
double allegiance—to the idea of sacred
monarchy for its symbolic value and to modern
concepts of law and administration—was
maintained. Out of reverence for traditional
kingship, for instance, the Oba of Benin, whose
office was closely identified with Edo religion,
was accepted as the sponsor of a Yoruba
political movement. In the Eastern Region,
appointed officials who were given "warrants"
and hence called warrant chiefs, were strongly
resisted by the people because they lacked
traditional claims.
In practice, British administrative procedures
under indirect rule entailed constant interaction
between colonial authorities and local rulers—
the system was modified to fit the needs of
each region. In the north, for instance,
legislation took the form of a decree cosigned
by the governor and the emir, while in the
south, the governor sought the approval of the
Legislative Council. Hausa was recognized as
an official language in the north, and
knowledge of it was expected of colonial
officers serving there. In the South, only
English had official status. Regional
administrations also varied widely in the
quality of local personnel and in the scope of
the operations they were willing to undertake.
British staffs in each region continued to
operate according to procedures developed
before unification. Economic links among the
regions increased, but indirect rule tended to
discourage political interchange. There was
virtually no pressure for greater unity among
the regions until after the end of World War II.
Public works, such as harbour dredging and
road and railway construction, opened Nigeria
to economic development. British soap and
cosmetics manufacturers tried to obtain land
concessions for growing oil palms, but these
were refused. Instead, the companies had to
be content with a monopoly of the export trade
in these products. Other commercial crops,
such as cocoa and rubber, were encouraged,
and tin was mined on the Jos Plateau.
The only significant interruption in economic
development arose from natural disaster—the
great drought of 1913-14. Recovery came
quickly and improvements in port facilities and
the transportation infrastructure during World
War I furthered economic development.
Nigerian recruits participated in the war effort
as laborers and soldiers. The Nigeria Regiment
of the RWAFF, integrating troops from the
north and south, saw action against German
colonial forces in Cameroon and in German
East Africa.
During the war, the colonial government
earmarked a large portion of the Nigerian
budget as a contribution to imperial defense.
To raise additional revenues, Lugard took steps
to institute a uniform tax structure patterned
on the traditional system that he had adopted
in the north during his tenure there. Taxes
became a source of discontent in the south,
however, and contributed to disturbances
protesting British policy. In 1920 portions of
former German Cameroon were mandated to
Britain by the League of Nations and were
administered as part of Nigeria.
Until he stepped down as Governor-General in
1918, Lugard primarily was concerned with
consolidating British sovereignty and with
assuring local administration through
traditional leaders. He was contemptuous of
the educated and Westernised African elite
found more in the South, and he recommended
transferring the capital from Lagos, the
cosmopolitan city where the influence of these
people was most pronounced, to Kaduna in the
north. Although the capital was not moved,
Lugard's bias in favor of the Muslim north was
clear at the time. Lugard bequeathed to his
successor a prosperous colony when his term
as Governor-General expired.
The policy of indirect rule used in Northern
Nigeria became a model for British colonies
elsewhere in Africa. [59]
Flag of British Colonial Nigeria
Sculptural representation of Africa at
the Colonial Office building on
Whitehall street; created by Henry
Hugh Armstead
Lugard's immediate successor, Sir Hugh
Clifford, was an aristocratic professional
administrator with liberal instincts who had
won recognition for his enlightened
governorship of the Gold Coast . The
approaches of the two governors to colonial
development were diametrically opposed. In
contrast to Lugard, Clifford argued that
colonial government had the responsibility to
introduce as quickly as practical the benefits
of Western experience. He was aware that the
Muslim north would present problems, but he
had hopes for progress along the lines which
he laid down in the south, where he
anticipated "general emancipation" leading to a
more representative form of government.
Clifford emphasized economic development,
encouraging enterprises by immigrant
southerners in the north while restricting
European participation to capital intensive
activity.
Uneasy with the amount of latitude allowed
traditional leaders under indirect rule, Clifford
opposed further extension of the judicial
authority held by the northern emirs. He said
that he did "not consider that their past
traditions and their present backward cultural
conditions afford to any such experiment a
reasonable chance of success." [60] In the
south, he saw the possibility of building an
elite educated in schools modeled on a
European method (and numerous elite children
attended high-ranking colleges in Britain during
the colonial years). These schools would teach
"the basic principles that would and should
regulate character and conduct." [60] In line
with this attitude, he rejected Lugard's
proposal for moving the capital from Lagos,
the stronghold of the elite in whom he placed
so much confidence for the future.
Clifford also believed that indirect rule
encouraged centripetal tendencies. He argued
that the division into two separate colonies
was advisable unless a stronger central
government could bind Nigeria into more than
just an administrative convenience for the
three regions. Whereas Lugard had applied
lessons learned in the north to the
administration of the south, Clifford was
prepared to extend to the north practices that
had been successful in the south. Sir
Richmond Palmer , acting as Lieutenant-
Governor in the North, disagreed with Clifford
and advocated the principles of Lugard and
further decentralisation. [57]
The Colonial Office, where Lugard was still
held in high regard, accepted that changes
might be due in the south, but it forbade
fundamental alteration of procedures in the
north. A.J. Harding, director of Nigerian affairs
at the Colonial Office, defined the official
position of the British government in support of
indirect rule when he said that "direct
government by impartial and honest men of
alien race . . . never yet satisfied a nation long
and . . . under such a form of government, as
wealth and education increase, so do political
discontent and sedition." [60]
Economics and finance
Looms in Lagos, photographed in 1910–1913
by H. Hunting of the Patterson Zuchonis
trading company
The British treasury initially supported the
landlocked Northern Nigeria Protectorate with
grants, totaling £250,000 or more each year.
[61] Its revenue quickly increased, from £4,424
in 1901 to £274,989 in 2010. The Southern
Protectorate financed itself from the outset,
with revenue increasing from £361,815 to
£1,933,235 over the same period. [62]
After establishing political control of the
country, the British implemented a system of
taxation in order to force the indigenous
Africans to shift from subsistence farming to
wage labor . Sometimes forced labor was used
directly for public works projects. These
policies met with ongoing resistance[63][64]
Much of the colony's budget went to
payments of its military, the Royal West
African Frontier Force (RWAFF). [65] In 1936, of
£6,259,547 income for the Nigerian state,
£1,156,000 went back to England as home pay
for British officials in the Nigerian civil service.
[66]
Oil exploration began in 1906 under John
Simon Bergheim's Nigeria Bitumen
Corporation, to which the Colonial Office
granted exclusive rights. In 1907, the
Corporation received a loan of £25,000,
repayable upon discovery of oil. Other firms
applying for licenses were rejected. In
November 1908, Bergheim reported striking oil;
in September 1909, he reported extracting
2,000 barrels per day. However, development
of the Nigerian oilfields slowed when Bergheim
died in a car crash in September 1912. Lugard,
replacing Egerton as governor, aborted the
project in May 1913. The British turned to
Persia for oil. [67]
European traders in Nigeria initially made
widespread use of cowrie , which was already
valued locally. The influx of cowrie lead to
inflation.
Emergence of Southern
Nigerian nationalism
British colonialism created Nigeria, joining
diverse peoples and regions in an artificial
political entity along the Niger River. The
nationalism that became a political factor in
Nigeria during the interwar period derived both
from an older political particularism and broad
pan-Africanism, rather than from any sense
among the people of a common Nigerian
nationality. The goal of activists initially was
not self-determination, but increased
participation on a regional level in the
governmental process.
Inconsistencies in British policy reinforced
existing cleavages based on regional
animosities, as the British tried both to
preserve the indigenous cultures of each area
and to introduce modern technology, and
Western political and social concepts. In the
north, appeals to Islamic legitimacy upheld the
rule of the emirs, so that nationalist
sentiments were related to Islamic ideals.
Modern nationalists in the south, whose
thinking was shaped by European ideas,
opposed indirect rule, as they believed that it
had strengthened what they considered an
anachronistic ruling class and shut out the
emerging Westernised elite.
The southern nationalists were inspired by a
variety of sources, including such prominent
American-based activists as Marcus Garvey
and W.E.B. Du Bois. Nigerian students abroad,
particularly at British schools, joined those
from other colonies in pan-African groups,
such as the West African Students Union,
founded in London in 1925. Early nationalists
tended to ignore Nigeria as the focus of
patriotism. Their common denominators
tended to be based on newly assertive ethnic
consciousness, particularly that of the Yoruba
and Igbo. Despite acceptance of European and
North American influences, the nationalists
were critical of colonialism for its failure to
appreciate the antiquity, richness and
complexity of indigenous cultures. They wanted
self-government, charging that only colonial
rule prevented the unshackling of progressive
forces in Nigeria and other states.
Political opposition to colonial rule often
assumed religious dimensions. Independent
Christian churches had emerged at the end of
the nineteenth century. European
interpretations of Christian orthodoxy in some
cases refused to allow the incorporation of
local customs and practices, although the
various mission denominations interpreted
Christianity in different ways. Most Europeans
tended to overlook their own differences and
were surprised and shocked that Nigerians
wanted to develop new denominations
independent of European control. Protestant
sects had flourished in Christianity since the
Reformation; the emergence of independent
Christian churches in Nigeria (as of black
denominations in the United States) was
another phase of this history. The pulpits of
the independent congregations became
avenues for the free expression of critics of
colonial rule.
Colonial Lagos circa 1910
In the 1920s, Nigerians began to form a
variety of associations, such as professional
and business associations, such as the
Nigerian Union of Teachers; the Nigerian Law
Association, which brought together lawyers,
many of whom had been educated in Britain;
and the Nigerian Produce Traders' Association,
led by Obafemi Awolowo. While initially
organized for professional and fraternal
reasons, these were centers of educated people
who had chances to develop their leadership
skills in the organizations, as well as form
broad social networks.
Ethnic and kinship organizations that often
took the form of a tribal union also emerged in
the 1920s. These organizations were primarily
urban phenomena that arose after numerous
rural migrants moved to the cities. Alienated
by the anonymity of the urban environment
and drawn together by ties to their ethnic
homelands—as well as by the need for mutual
aid—the new city dwellers formed local clubs
that later expanded into federations covering
whole regions. By the mid-1940s, the major
ethnic groups had formed such associations as
the Igbo Federal Union and the Egbe Omo
Oduduwa (Society of the Descendants of
Oduduwa), a Yoruba cultural movement, in
which Awolowo played a leading role. In some
cases, British assignment of people to ethnic
groups, and treatment based along ethnic
lines, led to identification with ethnicity where
none had existed before. [68]
A third type of organization that was more
pointedly political was the youth or student
group, which became the vehicle of
intellectuals and professionals. They were the
most politically conscious segment of the
population and created the vanguard of the
nationalist movement. Newspapers, some of
which were published before World War I,
provided coverage of nationalist views.
The 1922 constitution provided Nigerians the
chance to elect a handful of representatives to
the Legislative Council. The principal figure in
the political activity that ensued was Herbert
Macauley , often referred to as the father of
Nigerian nationalism. He aroused political
awareness through his newspaper, the Lagos
Daily News . He also led the Nigerian National
Democratic Party (NNDP), which dominated
elections in Lagos from its founding in 1922
until the ascendancy of the National Youth
Movement (NYM) in 1938. His political
platform called for economic and educational
development, Africanization of the civil service,
and self-government for Lagos. Significantly,
Macauley's NNDP remained almost entirely a
Lagos party, popular only in the area whose
people already had experience in elective
politics.
The National Youth Movement (NYM) used
nationalist rhetoric to agitate for improvements
in education. The movement brought to public
notice a long list of future leaders, including
H.O. Davies and Nnamdi Azikiwe. Although
Azikiwe later came to be recognized as the
leading spokesman for national unity, when he
first returned from university training in the
United States, his outlook was pan-African
rather than nationalist, and emphasized the
common African struggle against European
colonialism. (This was also reflective of
growing pan-Africanism among American
activists of the time.) Azikiwe had less interest
in purely Nigerian goals than did Davies, a
student of Harold Laski at the London School
of Economics, whose political orientation was
considered left-wing.
By 1938 the NYM was agitating for dominion
status within the British Commonwealth of
Nations, so that Nigeria would have the same
status as Canada and Australia. In elections
that year, the NYM ended the domination of
the NNDP in the Legislative Council and
worked to establish a national network of
affiliates. Three years later internal divisions
arose that were dominated by major ethnic
loyalties. The departure of Azikiwe and other
Igbo members of the NYM left the organization
in Yoruba hands. During World War II, Awolowo
reorganized it as a predominantly Yoruba
political party, the Action Group. Yoruba-Igbo
rivalry became increasingly important in
Nigerian politics (see Ethnic Relations, ch. 2).
During World War II, three battalions of the
Nigeria Regiment fought in the Ethiopian
campaign. Nigerian units also contributed to
two divisions serving with British forces in
Palestine, Morocco, Sicily, and Burma, where
they won many honors. Wartime experiences
provided a new frame of reference for many
soldiers, who interacted across ethnic
boundaries in ways that were unusual in
Nigeria. The war also made the British
reappraise Nigeria's political future. The war
years, brought a polarization between the
older, more parochial leaders inclined toward
gradualism and the younger intellectuals, who
thought in more immediate terms.
The rapid growth of organized labour in the
1940s also brought new political forces into
play. During the war, union membership
increased sixfold to 30,000. The proliferation of
labor organizations fragmented the movement,
and potential leaders lacked the experience and
skill to draw workers together.
The Action Group was largely the creation of
Awolowo, general secretary of Egbe Omo
Oduduwa and leader of the Nigerian Produce
Traders' Association. The Action Group was
thus the heir of a generation of flourishing
cultural consciousness among the Yoruba and
also had valuable connections with commercial
interests that were representative of the
comparative economic advancement of the
Western Region. Awolowo had little difficulty in
appealing to broad segments of the Yoruba
population, but he worked to avoid the Action
Group from being stigmatized as a "tribal"
group. Despite his somewhat successful efforts
to enlist non-Yoruba support, the regionalist
sentiment that had stimulated the party
initially continued.
Segments of the Yoruba community had their
own animosities and new rivalries arose. For
example, many people in Ibadan opposed
Awolowo on personal grounds because of his
identification with the Ijebu Yoruba. Despite
these difficulties, the Action Group rapidly built
an effective organization. Its program reflected
greater planning and was more ideologically
oriented than that of the NCNC . Although
lacking Azikiwe's compelling personality,
Awolowo was a formidable debater as well as
a vigorous and tenacious political campaigner.
He used for the first time in Nigeria modern,
sometimes flamboyant, electioneering
techniques. Among his leading lieutenants
were Samuel Akintola of Ibadan and the Oni of
Ife.
The Action Group consistently supported
minority-group demands for autonomous
states within a federal structure, as well as the
severance of a midwest state from the Western
Region. It assumed that comparable
alterations would be made elsewhere, an
attitude that won the party minority voting
support in the other regions. It backed Yoruba
irredentism in the Fulani-ruled emirate of Ilorin
in the Northern Region, and separatist
movements among non-Igbo in the Eastern
Region.
The Northern People's Congress (NPC) was
organized in the late 1940s by a small group
of Western-educated Northern Nigerians. They
had obtained the assent of the emirs to form a
political party to counterbalance the activities
of the southern-based parties. It represented a
substantial element of reformism in the North.
The most powerful figure in the party was
Ahmadu Bello, the sardauna (war leader) of
Sokoto.
Bello wanted to protect northern social and
political institutions from southern influence.
He insisted on maintaining the territorial
integrity of the Northern Region. He was
prepared to introduce educational and
economic changes to strengthen the north.
Although his own ambitions were limited to
the Northern Region, Bello backed the NPC's
successful efforts to mobilize the north's large
voting strength so as to win control of the
national government.
The NPC platform emphasized the integrity of
the north, its traditions, religion, and social
order. Support for broad Nigerian concerns
occupied a clear second place. A lack of
interest in extending the NPC beyond the
Northern Region corresponded to this strictly
regional orientation. Its activist membership
was drawn from local government and emirate
officials who had access to means of
communication and to repressive traditional
authority that could keep the opposition in line.
The small contingent of northerners who had
been educated abroad—a group that included
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and Aminu Kano —
was allied with British-backed efforts to
introduce gradual change to the emirates. The
emirs gave support to limited modernization
largely from fears of the unsettling presence of
southerners in the north, and by observing the
improvements in living conditions in the South.
Northern leaders committed to modernization
were also firmly connected to the traditional
power structure. Most internal problems were
concealed, and open opposition to the
domination of the Muslim aristocracy was not
tolerated. Critics, including representatives of
the middle belt who resented Muslim
domination, were relegated to small, peripheral
parties or to inconsequential separatist
movements. [69]
In 1950 Aminu Kano, who had been
instrumental in founding the NPC, broke away
to form the Northern Elements Progressive
Union (NEPU), in protest against the NPC's
limited objectives and what he regarded as a
vain hope that traditional rulers would accept
modernization. NEPU formed a parliamentary
alliance with the NCNC.
The NPC continued to represent the interests
of the traditional order in the pre-independence
deliberations. After the defection of Kano, the
only significant disagreement within the NPC
was related to moderates. Men such as
Balewa believed that only by overcoming
political and economic backwardness could the
NPC protect the foundations of traditional
northern authority against the influence of the
more advanced south.
In all three regions, minority parties
represented the special interests of ethnic
groups, especially as they were affected by the
majority. They never were able to elect
sizeable legislative delegations, but they served
as a means of public expression for minority
concerns. They received attention from major
parties before elections, at which time either a
dominant party from another region or the
opposition party in their region sought their
alliance.
The political parties jockeyed for positions of
power in anticipation of the independence of
Nigeria. Three constitutions were enacted from
1946 to 1954. While each generated
considerable political controversy, they moved
the country toward greater internal autonomy,
with an increasing role for the political parties.
The trend was toward the establishment of a
parliamentary system of government, with
regional assemblies and a federal House of
Representatives.
In 1946 a new constitution was approved by
the British Parliament at Westminster and
promulgated in Nigeria. Although it reserved
effective power in the hands of the Governor-
General and his appointed Executive Council ,
the so-called Richards Constitution (after
Governor-General Sir Arthur Richards , who was
responsible for its formulation) provided for an
expanded Legislative Council empowered to
deliberate on matters affecting the whole
country. Separate legislative bodies, the
houses of assembly, were established in each
of the three regions to consider local questions
and to advise the lieutenant governors. The
introduction of the federal principle, with
deliberative authority devolved on the regions,
signaled recognition of the country's diversity.
Although realistic in its assessment of the
situation in Nigeria, the Richards Constitution
undoubtedly intensified regionalism as an
alternative to political unification.
The pace of constitutional change accelerated
after the promulgation of the Richards
Constitution. It was suspended in 1950
against a call for greater autonomy, which
resulted in an inter-parliamentary conference
at Ibadan in 1950. The conference drafted the
terms of a new constitution. The so-called
Macpherson Constitution , after the incumbent
Governor-General, went into effect the
following year.
The most important innovations in the new
charter reinforced the dual course of
constitutional evolution, allowing for both
regional autonomy and federal union. By
extending the elective principle and by
providing for a central government with a
Council of Ministers, the Macpherson
Constitution gave renewed impetus to party
activity and to political participation at the
national level. But by providing for comparable
regional governments exercising broad
legislative powers, which could not be
overridden by the newly established 185-seat
federal House of Representatives, the
Macpherson Constitution also gave a
significant boost to regionalism. Subsequent
revisions contained in the Lyttleton
Constitution , enacted in 1954, firmly
established the federal principle and paved the
way for independence.
In 1957 the Western and the Eastern regions
became formally self-governing under the
parliamentary system. Similar status was
acquired by the Northern Region two years
later. There were numerous differences of
detail among the regional systems, but all
adhered to parliamentary forms and were
equally autonomous in relation to the federal
government at Lagos. The federal government
retained specified powers, including
responsibility for banking, currency, external
affairs, defense, shipping and navigation, and
communications, but real political power was
centered in the regions. Significantly, the
regional governments controlled public
expenditures derived from revenues raised
within each region.
Ethnic cleavages intensified in the 1950s.
Political activists in the southern areas spoke
of self-government in terms of educational
opportunities and economic development.
Because of the spread of mission schools and
wealth derived from export crops, the southern
parties were committed to policies that would
benefit the south of the country. In the north,
the emirs intended to maintain firm control on
economic and political change.
Any activity in the north that might include
participation by the federal government (and
consequently by southern civil servants) was
regarded as a challenge to the primacy of the
emirates. Broadening political participation and
expanding educational opportunities and other
social services also were viewed as threats to
the status quo. An extensive immigrant
population of southerners, especially Igbo,
already were living in the north; they
dominated clerical positions and were active in
many trades.
The cleavage between the Yoruba and the Igbo
was accentuated by their competition for
control of the political machinery. The receding
British presence enabled local officials and
politicians to gain access to patronage over
government jobs, funds for local development,
market permits, trade licenses, government
contracts, and even scholarships for higher
education. In an economy with many qualified
applicants for every post, great resentment
was generated by any favoritism that
authorities showed to members of their own
ethnic group.
In the immediate post-World War II period,
Nigeria benefited from a favourable trade
balance. Although per capita income in the
country as a whole remained low by
international standards, rising incomes among
salaried personnel and burgeoning urbanization
expanded consumer demand for imported
goods.
In the meantime, public sector spending
increased even more dramatically than export
earnings. It was supported not only by the
income from huge agricultural surpluses but
also by a new range of direct and indirect
taxes imposed during the 1950s. The transfer
of responsibility for budgetary management
from the central to the regional governments in
1954 accelerated the pace of public spending
on services and on development projects. Total
revenues of central and regional governments
nearly doubled in relation to the gross
domestic product (GDP—see Glossary) during
the decade.
The most dramatic event having a long-term
effect on Nigeria's economic development, was
the discovery and exploitation of petroleum
deposits. The search for oil, begun in 1908 and
abandoned a few years later, was revived in
1937 by Shell and British Petroleum.
Exploration was intensified in 1946, but the
first commercial discovery did not occur until
1956, at Olobiri in the Niger Delta. In 1958
exportation of Nigerian oil was initiated at
facilities constructed at Port Harcourt. Oil
income was still marginal, but the prospects
for continued economic expansion appeared
bright and accentuated political rivalries on the
eve of independence.
The election of the House of Representatives
after the adoption of the 1954 constitution
gave the NPC a total of seventy-nine seats, all
from the Northern Region. Among the other
major parties, the NCNC took fifty-six seats,
winning a majority in both the Eastern and the
Western regions, while the Action Group
captured only twenty-seven seats. The NPC
was called on to form a government, but the
NCNC received six of the ten ministerial posts.
Three of these posts were assigned to
representatives from each region, and one was
reserved for a delegate from the Northern
Cameroons.
As a further step toward independence, the
governor's Executive Council was merged with
the Council of Ministers in 1957 to form the
all-Nigerian Federal Executive Council. The
NPC federal parliamentary leader, Balewa, was
appointed prime minister. Balewa formed a
coalition government that included the Action
Group as well as the NCNC to prepare the
country for the final British withdrawal. His
government guided the country for the next
three years, operating with almost complete
autonomy in internal affairs.
The preparation of a new federal constitution
for an independent Nigeria was carried out at
conferences held at Lancaster House in
London in 1957 and 1958, which were presided
over by The Rt. Hon. Alan Lennox-Boyd , M.P. ,
the British Secretary of State for the Colonies.
Nigerian delegates were selected to represent
each region and to reflect various shades of
opinion. The delegation was led by Balewa of
the NPC and included party leaders Awolowo
of the Action Group, Azikiwe of the NCNC, and
Bello of the NPC; they were also the premiers
of the Western, Eastern, and Northern regions,
respectively. Independence was achieved on
October 1, 1960.
Elections were held for a new and greatly
enlarged House of Representatives in December
1959; 174 of the 312 seats were allocated to
the Northern Region on the basis of its larger
population. The NPC, entering candidates only
in the Northern Region, confined campaigning
largely to local issues but opposed the addition
of new regimes. The NCNC backed creation of
a midwest state and proposed federal control
of education and health services.
The Action Group, which staged a lively
campaign, favored stronger government and
the establishment of three new states, while
advocating creation of a West Africa Federation
that would unite Nigeria with Ghana and Sierra
Leone. The NPC captured 142 seats in the new
legislature. Balewa was called on to head a
NPC-NCNC coalition government, and
Awolowo became official leader of the
opposition.
Independent Nigeria (1960)
By a British Act of Parliament, Nigeria became
an independent country (as a Commonwealth
realm ) within the Commonwealth on October 1,
1960. Azikiwe was installed as Governor-
General of the federation and Balewa continued
to serve as head of a democratically elected
parliamentary, but now completely sovereign,
government. The Governor-General represented
the British monarch as head of state and was
appointed by the Crown on the advice of the
Nigerian Prime Minister in consultation with
the regional premiers. The Governor-General, in
turn, was responsible for appointing the Prime
Minister and for choosing a candidate from
among contending leaders when there was no
parliamentary majority. Otherwise, the
Governor-General's office was essentially
ceremonial.
The government was responsible to a
Parliament composed of the popularly elected
312-member House of Representatives and the
44-member Senate, chosen by the regional
legislatures.
In general, the regional constitutions followed
the federal model, both structurally and
functionally. The most striking departure was
in the Northern Region, where special
provisions brought the regional constitution
into consonance with Islamic law and custom.
The similarity between the federal and regional
constitutions was deceptive, however, and the
conduct of public affairs reflected wide
differences among the regions.
In February 1961, a plebiscite was conducted
to determine the disposition of the Southern
Cameroons and Northern Cameroons, which
were administered by Britain as United Nations
Trust Territories. By an overwhelming majority,
voters in the Southern Cameroons opted to
join formerly French-administered Cameroon
over integration with Nigeria as a separate
federated region. In the Northern Cameroons,
however, the largely Muslim electorate chose
to merge with Nigeria's Northern Region.
References
References
1. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), pp. 1–2. "Crown Colony Government in
Nigeria and elsewhere in the British Empire
was autocratic government. Officials at the
Colonial Office and colonial governors in the
field never pretended otherwise. In fact,
autocratic, bureaucratic rule was the true
legacy of British colonial government in Africa."
2. ^ Carland (1985), The Colonial Office and
Nigeria , p. 48.
3. ^ a b c d e f g Robin Hermann, "Empire
Builders and Mushroom Gentlemen: The
Meaning of Money in Colonial Nigeria",
International Journal of African Historical
Studies 44.3, 2011.
4. ^ a b c d e Ken Swindell, "The Commercial
Development of the North: Company and
Government Relations, 1900–1906", Paideuma
40, 1994, pp. 149–162.
5. ^ a b Carland, The Colonial Office and
Nigeria (1985), p. 90.
6. ^ a b c David Richardson, "Background to
annexation: Anglo-African credit relations in
the Bight of Biafra, 1700–1891"; in Pétré-
Grenouilleau, From Slave Trade to Empire
(2004), pp. 47–68.
7. ^ See Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations
(1776), Vol. 2 p. 112 . (Quoted in Richardson,
2004). "Though the Europeans possess many
considerable settlements both upon the coast
of Africa and in the East Indies, they have not
yet established in either of those countries
such numerous and thriving colonies as those
in the islands and continent of America."
8. ^ Isichei, A History of Nigeria (1983), p.
362.
9. ^ David Etlis, "African and European
relations in the last century of the transatlantic
slave trade"; in Pétré-Grenouilleau, From Slave
Trade to Empire (2004), pp. 21–46.
10. ^ Randy J. Sparks, The Two Princes of
Calabar: An Eighteenth-Century Atlantic
Odyssey ; Harvard University Press, 2004; ISBN
0-674-01312-3 ; Chapter 1: " A Very Bloody
Transaction: Old Calabar and the Massacre of
1767 ".
11. ^ a b c d e f Anietie A. Inyang & Manasseh
Edidem Bassey, "Imperial Treaties and the
Origins of British Colonial Rule in Southern
Nigeria, 1860-1890", Mediterranean Journal of
Social Sciences 5.20, September 2014.
12. ^ Asiegbu, Nigeria and its British Invaders
(1984), p. xxiii. "After the Abolition Act in 1807
making the trade in African slaves illegal for
British subjects, Britain did not stop there: For
the next quarter of a century successive British
Governments embarked on a kind of
aggressive diplomacy, bullying and bribing
other European nations, especially Spain and
Portugal, to toe the anti-slavery line with
England. / On the West African Coast itself
British anti-slavery policy became very evident
not only in the establishment of the free
colony or Settlement of Freetown in Sierra
Leone for the recaptives or freed slaves. A
detachment of the all-powerful British Navy,
the West African naval squadron, was
stationed in West African waters to patrol
along the coastline and to intercept any slave
ships or vessels equipped for the slave trade,
and to bring slave vessels captured for trial
before British controlled courts in Freetown. At
the same time Britain embarked on securing
from African rulers, in consideration of
payments to these rulers, what became known
as anti-slave trade treaties. By these treaties
the rulers engaged to stop the traffic in slaves
in their respective territories. In the process of
enforcing these anti-slave trade policies on the
west coast with its powerful navy Britain
discovered the military weakness or inferiority
of the African states in relation to its own
military power."
13. ^ a b Olatunji Ojo, "The Organization of the
Atlantic Slave Trade in Yorubaland, ca.1777 to
ca.1856", International Jounral of African
Historical Studies 41.1, 2008. "Slave
production in the interior raised exports from
Lagos ten fold, making it West Africa's leading
slave port. The most accurate trade figures are
found in the Trans-Atlantic slave voyage
database (TSD), which put the number of
slave exports between 1776 and 1850 at
308,800. Of that number only 24,000 slaves
were shipped before 1801, while 114,200 and
170,600 were sold during 1801–25 and 1826–
50, respectively. Exports from Badagry lagged
far behind, with about 37,400 slaves sold
during 1776–1860."
14. ^ Asiegbu, Nigeria and its British Invaders
(1984), pp. xiv–xv. "Here again, European and
African scholars have been at loggerheads and
in the same kinds of conflicts as had featured
in their interpretations of the primary motives
of the British anti-slavery movement and
abolitionism in the mid-19th century, namely,
British self-interest or imperial ambitions on
the one hand, and British humanitarian feeling
for Africa on the other hand."
15. ^ Tamuno, The Evolution of the Nigerian
State (1972), p. 6. "To the British, traffic in
human beings after 1807 was both
'uncivilised' and illegal. As the century went
on, a strong feeling developed that the slave
trade, as an aspect of piracy, stood
condemned in international and municipal law.
This change in moral tone over the slave trade
at first seemed incomprehensible to
generations of people in Southern Nigeria who
within a relatively short period were presented
with two different concepts of right and wrong.
Their scepticism about the correctness of such
conflicting standards persisted into the early
twentieth century."
16. ^ Warren Whatley & Rob Gillezeau, " The
Impact of the Slave Trade on African
Economies ", World Economic History
Congress, Utrecht, May 23, 2009.
17. ^ Helen Chapin Metz, ed. "Influence of
Christian Missions" , Nigeria: A Country
Study, Washington: GPO for the Library of
Congress, 1991, accessed 18 April 2012
18. ^ Tamuno, The Evolution of the Nigerian
State (1972), pp. 11–12.
19. ^ a b Bouda Etemad, "Economic relations
between Europe and Black Africa c . 1780–
1938"; in Pétré-Grenouilleau, From Slave Trade
to Empire (2004), pp. 69–81.
20. ^ Tamuno, The Evolution of the Nigerian
State (1972), p. 14. "The most significant
economic development in Southern Nigeria
since 1807 was the transition from the pre-
colonial emphasis on subsistence agriculture
to an increasing concentration on production
for sale."
21. ^ a b Carland, The Colonial Office and
Nigeria (1985), p. 2.
22. ^ a b c Asiegbu, Nigeria and its British
Invaders (1984), pp. xxv. "In the Lagos Colony
Captain John Glover, as administrator of the
Colony, created between 1861 and 1862 the
famous Hausa militia ('Glover's Hausas')
which became the nucleus of the Lagos
Constabulary (itself splitting after 1895 into
two bodies, one a civil police force, the other a
military unit). The earliest recruits into the
Lagos militia came from the liberated African
yard or depot which glover had established in
the Colony for the reception of run-away
domestic slaves from the surrounding local
communities. In the Niger territories, the Royal
Niger Company organized its own constabulary
forces between 1886 and 1899; at the Niger
Coast Protectorate the Consular
Administration, with its headquarters at
Calabar, established after 1891 the Niger
Coast Protectorate Force or Constabulary,
sometimes known as the 'Oil Rivers
Irregulars' (which under Consul Annesley
acquired the name of the 'forty thieves'). Thus
by 1897 when the WAFF was created, British
West Africa had in some form or other known,
like French West Africa, almost half a century
of European or British military presence and
activity."
23. ^ Tamuno, The Evolution of the Nigerian
State (1972), pp. 15.
24. ^ "Northern Nigeria: The Illo Canceller and
Borgu Mail" by Ray Harris in Cameo, Vol. 14,
No. 3, Whole No. 90, October 2013, pp.
158-160.
25. ^ Afeadie, "The Hidden Hand of
Overrule" (1996), p. 10–12.
26. ^ Afeadie, "The Hidden Hand of
Overrule" (1996), p. 12–13. "Specifically, the
Company sought to secure the cooperation of
the traditional rulers in ensuring peaceful
conditions for trade. For this objective, the
Company chose to administer the African
inhabitants of the Niger Sudan through their
traditional rulers and their political institutions.
[…] They needed special personnel: such
officials who knew the local conditions and
who could communicate between the Company
and the indigenous people. […] These
intermediaries assisted government diplomacy
and helped to establish and maintain relations
between the company and the traditional
rulers. They gathered information which was
needed for policy-making in administration.
Some of them also manned Company stations
and served as District Agents."
27. ^ Afeadie, "The Hidden Hand of
Overrule" (1996), p. 13–15.
28. ^ Isichei, A History of Nigeria (1983), p.
372–373.
29. ^ Asiegbu, Nigeria and its British Invaders
(1984), pp. xiv, xxviii–xxx.
30. ^ Isichei, A History of Nigeria (1983), pp.
365–366.
31. ^ Tamuno, The Evolution of the Nigerian
State (1972), p. xiv.
32. ^ Isichei, A History of Nigeria (1983), p.
367.
33. ^ Isichei, A History of Nigeria (1983), pp.
367–368. "East of the Niger, where no obvious
and redoubtable foe existed, it was necessary
to invent one. Gradually, in the dispatches of
the 1890s, one sees the emergence of an
image of Arochukwu rather like that which
prevailed of Benin at the same time: a sinister
'fetish' power, deeply involved with slave
trading, indelibly opposed to European
penetration, and wielding a very great influence
over the politics of other states. One has the
suggestion that the Igbo were in need of
release from Aro tyranny, precisely the
suggestion which was made with reference to
Benin and the Sokoto Caliphate."
34. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), pp. 56–58. "And so, flying the flags of
civilisation and commerce, the Colonial Office
finally authorized the expedition to begin in
December 1901. Over the summer the Aros
conveniently made some slave raids on
neighbouring tribes, providing the Colonial
Office and the Southern Nigerian Government
with, as Nigeria Department member Butler
termed it, 'the technical justification for the
expedition' which, as he further noted, had
'already been decided to be necessary on more
general grounds'. The expedition began and
ended right on schedule."
35. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), pp. 58–59. "Moor's successor, Sir
Walter Egerton, quickly embarked on, with the
blessings of the Colonial Office, a policy of
sending out pacification patrols annually. For
the most part the patrols did not involve the
use of force so much as they did the threat of
force if submission was not made. At the
beginning of each dry season the Southern
Nigerian troops would establish a central base
on the edge of the area they were to take over.
Then small columns of soldiers would be sent
out to different parts of the unoccupied
country. Usually this show of force was
enough, and the area would soon be open for
the introduction of district administration and
commercial development."
36. ^ Isichei, A History of Nigeria (1983), p.
369–371.
37. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), pp. 60–62.
38. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), p. 64.
39. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), p. 68.
40. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), p. 50.
41. ^ Asiegbu, Nigeria and its British Invaders
(1984), pp. xxv–xxvii. "Right from the start
Lugard adopted a policy of keeping the entire
force predominantly Hausa, with Yorubas as
the next preferred ethnic group to recruit into
the force. By the middle of 1898 Lugard
reported to the Colonial Office that there were
already some 2600 native soldiers (made up of
Hausa and Yorubas in equal proportions) in the
force, while more vigorous recruiting
expeditions were being undertaken by
European officials into Yorubaland and
Northern Nigeria. [...] Adequate historical
information and knowledge about the
organization and exploits of the WAFF, the
military activities and experiences of some of
the remarkable personalities and individual
soldiers and officials who belonged to it, have
unfortunately been lacking in our own time
thanks to the strict official policy of secrecy
and silence which the British government
imposed right from the start on all officers
serving in, or retired from, that force."
42. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), pp. 3–4, 50–52.
43. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), pp. 19–22. "Those in the upper middle
class were in higher-income groups or in
important professional, commercial, or
industrial positions. / These definitions place
Colonial Office permanent officials primarily in
the upper middle class. This can be seen by
looking at Table 1.2 Three of these men —
William Baillie Hamilton, Dougal Malcolm, and
Charles Strachey — also had connections with
the nobility and landed gentry. Nine had
fathers in prestigious occupations — the
Church, the Bar, and the highest ranks of the
Civil Service and the armed forces; and the
remaining five had fathers in the important
professional, commercial, or industrial
positions."
44. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), p. 31.
45. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), p. 32–33.
46. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), pp. 35–37.
47. ^ a b Carland, The Colonial Office and
Nigeria (1985), pp. 104–109.
48. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), pp. 135–153.
49. ^ a b Carland, The Colonial Office and
Nigeria (1985), pp. 79–84.
50. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), p. 87. "Although permanent officials
like some, though not all, of Lugard's ideas,
they had built up considerable antipathy
toward Lugard during his tour of duty in
Northern Nigeria (1900–6). His unorthodox
and administratively untidy ways exasperated
them. However, Harcourt and Anderson
decided they could not have Lugard's ideas
without Lugard. In August 1911 Anderson told
Lugard that they were anxious to amalgamate
the Nigerian administrations; 'But our difficulty
is to get the right man for the job. We are
agreed that you are that man.'"
51. ^ a b Carland, The Colonial Office and
Nigeria (1985), p. 88–89.
52. ^ Asiegbu, Nigeria and its British Invaders
(1984), p. xxxi.
53. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), pp. 92–100.
54. ^ Afeadie, "The Hidden Hand of
Overrule" (1996), p. 17–19.
55. ^ Afeadie, "The Hidden Hand of
Overrule" (1996), p. 19–21. "The agents
performed similar but more expansive roles as
their Company counterparts. They were
instrumental in the development of government
diplomacy with the traditional rulers; they
spread government propaganda among the
indigenous peoplke; and they assisted colonial
officials in parleying with native forces at war
with government troops. Agents also collected
intelligence for the colonial officials; they
gathered information on public opinion and the
military resources of the local polities; they
also spied on rival colonial forces in foreign
territories."
56. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), pp. 70–71.
57. ^ a b c Sir Richmond Palmer
58. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), p. 67.
59. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), p. 66. "In British colonial
administrative history the importance of
indirect rule – in theory and in practice –
should not be underestimated. Indirect rule, as
it developed in Northern Nigeria before 1914,
became the most influential model for local
government in other British Crown Colonies. By
the 1930s practically all of British tropical
Africa, outside the urban areas, had accepted
indirect rule as the basic mode of local
government."
60. ^ a b c Helen Chapin Metz, ed. Nigeria: A
Country Study. Washington: GPO for the
Library of Congress, 1991. Retrieved October
11, 2014 from http://countrystudies.us/
nigeria/19.htm
61. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), pp. 85–86, 103.
62. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), p. 119.
63. ^ Isichei, A History of Nigeria (1983), pp.
386–388.
64. ^ Elliot J. Berg, "The Development of a
Labor Force in Sub-Saharan Africa"; Economic
Development and Cultural Change 13.4, July
1965.
65. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), pp. 127–128.
66. ^ Isichei, A History of Nigeria (1983), p.
380.
67. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), pp. 184–198.
68. ^ Isichei, A History of Nigeria (1983), p.
392–393. "A Tiv political sociologist has
explored this theme in Tiv experience. As late
as the early 'thirties, a well informed observer
could state, 'I am not conscious of any race
consciousness among the Tiv except on the
very widest and vaguest basis . . .'. But this
soon changed. 'By its constant treatment of
the Tiv as a corporate body with homogenous
interests, the Native Administration went a
long way towards creating the level of ethnic
consciousness which developed. And
conversely, by imposing a Yoruba Muslim from
Bida as Chief of Makurdi, the British created a
wholly new demand for a Tiv Paramount Chief,
Tor Tiv. By the 1960s, ethnic consciousness
had become a key determinant of Tiv political
behaviour."
69. ^ Helen Chapin Metz, ed. Nigeria: A
Country Study. Washington: GPO for the
Library of Congress, 1991. Retrieved October
11, 2014 from http://countrystudies.us/
nigeria/20.htm
Sources
Country Studies On-Line - Nigeria at the
Library of Congress
Bibliography
Afeadie, Philip Atsu. "The Hidden Hand of
Overrule: Political Agents and the
Establishment of British Colonial Rule in
Northern Nigeria, 1886–1914". PhD
dissertation accepted at the Graduate
Programme in History, York University, Ontario.
September 1996.
Asiegbu, Johnson U. J. Nigeria and its
British Invaders, 1851–1920: A Thematic
Documentary History. New York & Enugu: Nok
Publishers International, 1984. ISBN
0-88357-101-3
Carland, John M. The Colonial Office and
Nigeria, 1898–1914 . Hoover Institution Press,
Stanford University, 1985. ISBN
0-8179-8141-1
Falola, Toyin, & Matthew M. Heaton, A
History of Nigeria , Cambridge, 2008, ISBN
978-0-521-68157-5
Isichei, Elizabeth. A History of Nigeria .
Harlow, UK, and New York: Longman, Inc.,
1983. ISBN 0-582-64331-7
Pétré-Grenouilleau, Olivier (ed.). From Slave
Trade to Empire: Europe and the colonisation
of Black Africa 1780s–1880s. Abingdon, UK,
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5
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Flag of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria
Anthem
God Save the King /God Save the Queen
Nigeria (red)
British possessions in Africa (pink)
1914
Capital Lagos
Languages English
Government British Crown colony
High Commissioner /
Governor
- 1914–1919 Sir Frederick John
Dealtry Lugard
- 1948–1954 Sir John Stuart
Macpherson
History
- Established 1 January 1914
- Disestablished 1 October 1960
Currency British West African
pound (1914–1958)
Nigerian Pound (from
1958)
Slave trade and abolition
Missionaries
Commerce
Exploration
Lagos Colony
Oil Rivers Protectorate
We, the undersigned King and
Chiefs...with the view to the
bettering of the condition of
our country and people, do
this day cede to the National
Africa Company (Limited),
their heirs and assigns,
forever, the whole of our
territory...We also give the
said National African
Company (Limited) full power
to settle all native disputes
arising from any cause
whatever, and we pledge
ourselves not to enter into any
war with other tribes without
the sanction of the said
National Africa Company
(Limited).
We also understand that the
said National African
Company (limited) have full
power to mine, farm, and
build in any portion of our
territory. We bind ourselves
not to have any intercourse
with any strangers or
foreigners except through the
said national African
Company (Limited), and we
give the said National African
Company (Limited) full power
to exclude all other strangers
and foreigners from their
territory at their discretion.
In consideration of the
foregoing, the said National
African Company (Limited)
bind themselves not to
interfere with any of the
native laws or customs of the
country, consistently with the
maintenance of order and
good government...[and]
agree to pay native owners of
land a reasonable amount for
any portion they may require.
The said National African
Company (Limited) bind
themselves to protect the said
King and Chiefs from the
attacks of any neighbouring
tribes (Ibid.). [11]
“ The Company considered itself the sole
legitimate government of the area, with
executive, legislative, and judicial powers all
subordinate to the rule of a Council created by
the Company Board of Directors in London.
The Council was headed by a Governor. The
Deputy Governor served as Political
Administrator for company's territory, and
appointed three officials in Nigeria to carry out
the work of administration. These were the
Agent General, the Senior Judicial Officer, and
the Commandant of the Constabulary. [25]
However, the Company did accept that local
emirs could act as partners in governance and
trade. It therefore hired native intermediaries
who could conduct diplomacy, trade, and
intelligence work in the local area. [26]
The Company, as was common among
European businesses in Africa, paid its native
workers in barter. At the turn of the century,
top wages were four bags of salt (company
retail price, 3s 9d) for a month of work. [4]
Trade was also conducted through a
mechanism of barter and credit. Goods were
made available on credit to African middlemen,
who were expected to trade them at a pre-
arranged price and deliver the proceeds to the
Company. The Company's major imports to
the area included gin and low-quality firearms.
[3]
By the 1880s, the National African Company
became the dominant commercial power,
increasing from 19 to 39 stations between
1882 and 1993. In 1886, Taubman secured a
Royal Charter and his company became the
Royal Niger Company. The Charter allowed the
Company to collect customs and make treaties
with local leaders.[4]
Under Goldie's direction, the Royal Niger
Company was instrumental in depriving France
and Germany of access to the region.
Consequently, he may well deserve the epithet
"father of Nigeria," which historians accorded
him. He definitely laid the basis for British
claims.
The Royal Niger Company had its own armed
forces. [22] This included a river fleet which it
used for retalitatory attacked on uncooperative
villages. [3]
Britain's imperialistic posture became more
aggressive towards the end of the century. The
appointment of Joseph Chamberlain as
Colonial Secretary in 1895 especially marked a
shift towards new territorial ambitions of the
British Empire. [27] Economically, local colonial
administrators also pushed for the imposition
of British colonial rule, believing that trade and
taxation conducted in British pounds would
prove far more lucrative than a barter trade
which yielded only inconsistent customs
duties. [3]
Military conquest
The British led a series of military campaigns
to enlarge its sphere of influence and expand
its commercial opportunities. Most of the
fighting was done by Hausa soldiers, recruited
to fight against other groups. The superior
weapons, tactics, and political unity of the
British are commonly given as reasons for their
decisive ultimate victory. [28][29]
In 1892 the British forces set out to fight the
Ijebu Kingdom, which had resisted missionaries
and foreign traders. The legal justification for
this campaign was a treaty signed in 1886,
when the British had interceded as
peacemakers to end the Ekitiparapo war, which
imposed free trade requirements and mandated
that all parties continue to use British
channels for diplomacy. [11] Although the Ijebu
had some weapons they were wiped out by
British machine guns called Maxim guns. With
this victory, the British went on to conquer the
rest of Yorubaland, which had also been
weakened by sixteen years of civil war. [30] By
1893, most of the other political entities in
Yorubaland recognized the practical necessity
signing another treaty with the British, this one
explicitly joining them with the protectorate of
Lagos. [11][31]
King Koko in His War Canoe, London Daily
Graphic , March 30, 1985; depicting King
Frederick William Koko —onetime antagonist to
the Royal Niger Company
In 1896–1897 the forces of the Niger Coast
Protectorate fought with the remnants of the
Benin Empire. Following the defeat of an
unsuccessful foray by Consul General James
R. Phillips, a larger retaliatory force captured
Benin City and drove Ovonramwen , the Oba of
Benin, into exile.[32]
The British had difficulty conquering Igboland,
which lacked central political organization. In
the name of liberating the Igbos from the Aro
Confederacy, the British launched the Anglo-
Aro War of 1901–1902. Despite conquering
villages by burning houses and crops,
continual political control over the Igbo
remained elusive. [33][34] The British forces
began annual pacification missions to convince
the locals of British supremacy. [35]
A campaign against the Sokoto Caliphate
began in 1900 with the creation of the
Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, under the
direction of Governor Lugard. The British
captured Kano in 1903. Deadly battles broke
out sporadically through 1906. [36] Lugard was
slow to describe these excursions to the
Colonial Office, which apparently learned of
preparations to attack Kano from the
newspapers in December 1902. Not wishing to
appear out of control or weak, they approved
the expedition (two days after it began) on
January 19, 1903. [37] In general the Colonial
Office allowed Lugard's expeditions to
continue because they were framed as
retaliatory and, as Olivier commented in 1906,
"If the millions of people [in Nigeria] who do
not want us there once get the notion that our
people can be killed with impunity they will not
be slow to attempt it." [38]
Lugard informed the leaders of conquered
Sokoto :
Political administration under
the Crown
Further information: Northern Nigeria
Protectorate , Southern Nigeria Protectorate and
Provinces of Nigeria
The British Colonial Office in
Westminster , created in the 1860s
by architect George Gilbert Scott ;
illustrated in 1875
Contemporary photograph of the
same building, now housing the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Concrete plans for transition to Crown rule—
direct control by the British government—
apparently began in 1897. In May of this year,
Herbert J. Read published a Memorandum on
British possessions in West Africa, which
remarked upon the "inconvenient and
unscientific boundaries" between Lagos
Colony, the Niger Coast Protectorate, and the
Royal Niger Company. Read suggested they be
merged, and more use made of Nigeria's
natural resources[40] In the same year, the
British created the Royal West African Frontier
Force (RWAFF or WAFF), under the leadership
of Colonel Frederick Lugard. In one year,
Lugard recruited 2600 troops, evenly split
between Hausa and Yoruba. The officers of the
RWAFF were British. The operations of this
force are still not fully known due to a policy
of strict secrecy mandated by the British
government. [41]
Guidelines for running the Nigerian colony were
established in 1898 by the Niger Committee,
chaired by the Earl of Selborne , in 1898. The
British finalized the border between Nigeria
and French West Africa with the Anglo-French
Convention of 1898 . [42]
The territory of the Royal Niger Company
became the Northern Nigeria Protectorate , and
the Company itself became a private
corporation which continued to do business in
Nigeria. The Company received £865,000
compensation for the loss of its Charter. It
continued to enjoy special privileges and
maintained a de facto monopoly over
commerce. Under Lugard from 1900–1906, the
Protectorate consolidated political control over
the area through military conquest and
initiated the use of British currency in
substitute for barter. [3][4]
In 1900, the British government assumed
control of the Southern and Northern
Protectorates, both of which were ultimately
governed by the Colonial Office at Whitehall .
The staff of this office came primarily from the
British upper middle class—i.e., university-
educated men, primarily not nobility, with
fathers in well-respected professions. [43] The
first five heads of the Nigeria Department
(1898–1914) were Reginald Antrobus, William
Mercer, William Baillie Hamilton, Sydney
Olivier , and Charles Strachey. [44] Olivier was a
member of the Fabian Society and a friend of
George Bernard Shaw. [45]
Under the Colonial Office was the Governor,
who managed administration of his colony and
held powers of emergency rule. The Colonial
Office could veto or revise his policies. The
seven men who governed Northern Nigeria,
Southern Nigeria, and Lagos through 1914
were Henry McCallum , William MacGregor,
Walter Egerton , Ralph Moor, Percy Girouard ,
Hesketh Bell, and Frederick Lugard. Most of
these came from military backgrounds. All
were knighted. [46]
Undated British archival photo of locomotive in
Nigeria
Walter Egerton's sixfold agenda for 1908, as
detailed on November 29, 1907, in a telegram
to the Colonial Office, is representative of
British priorities. [47]
Egerton also supervised improvements to the
Lagos harbour and extension of the local
telegraph network. [47]
From 1895–1900, a railway was constructed
running from Lagos to Ibadan ; it opened in
March 1901. This line was extended to
Oshogbo, 62 miles away, in 1905–1907, and to
Zungeru and Minna in 1908–1911. Its final leg
enabled it to meet another line, constructed
1907–1911, running from Baro, through
Minnia, to Kano. [48]
Some of these public work projects were
accomplished with the help of forced labour,
referred to as "Political Labour". Village Heads
were paid 10 shillings for conscripts, and fined
£50 if they failed to supply. Individuals could
be fined or jailed for refusing to comply.[4]
Frederick Lugard , who was appointed as High
Commissioner of the Protectorate of Dutch
Geria in 1900 and served until 1906 in his first
term, often has been regarded by the British as
their model colonial administrator. Trained as
an army officer, he had served in India, Egypt,
and East Africa, where he expelled Arab slave
traders from Nyasaland and established the
British presence in Uganda. Joining the Royal
Niger Company in 1894, Lugard was sent to
Borgu to counter inroads made by the French,
and in 1897 he was made responsible for
raising the Royal West African Frontier Force
(RWAFF) from local levies to serve under
British officers.
During his six-year tenure as High
Commissioner, Sir Frederick Lugard (as he
became in 1901) was occupied with
transforming the commercial sphere of
influence inherited from the Royal Niger
Company into a viable territorial unit under
effective British political control. His objective
was to conquer the entire region and to obtain
recognition of the British protectorate by its
indigenous rulers, especially the Fulani emirs of
the Sokoto Caliphate . Lugard's campaign
systematically subdued local resistance, using
armed force when diplomatic measures failed.
Borno capitulated without a fight, but in 1903
Lugard's RWAFF mounted assaults on Kano
and Sokoto. From Lugard's point of view,
clear-cut military victories were necessary
because the surrenders of the defeated peoples
weakened resistance elsewhere.
Lugard's success in northern Nigeria has been
attributed to his policy of indirect rule; that is,
he governed the protectorate through the
rulers defeated by the British. If the emirs
accepted British authority, abandoned the slave
trade, and cooperated with British officials in
modernizing their administrations, the colonial
power was willing to confirm them in office.
The emirs retained their caliphate titles but
were responsible to British district officers,
who had final authority. The British High
Commissioners could depose emirs and other
officials if necessary.
A map displaying Southern and Northern
Nigeria, 1914.
Amalgamation of Nigeria was envisioned from
early on in its governance, as is made clear by
the report of the Niger Committee in 1898.
Combining the three jurisdictions would reduce
administrative expenses and facilitate
deployment of resources and money between
the areas. (Specifically it would enable direct
subsidy of the less profitable Northern
jurisdiction.) Antrobus, Fiddes, and Strachey in
the Colonial Office promoted amalgamation,
along with Lugard. [49]
Following the order recommended by the Niger
Committee, the Colonial Office merged Lagos
Colony and the Southern Nigeria Protectorate
on May 1, 1906, forming a larger protectorate
(still called the Southern Nigeria Protectorate)
which spanned the coastline between Dahomey
and Cameroon. [49]
Lugard advocated constantly for unification of
the whole territory, and in August 1911 the
Colonial Office asked Lugard to lead the
amalgamated colony. [50]
In 1912, Lugard returned to Nigeria from his
six-year term as Governor of Hong Kong , to
oversee the merger of the northern and
southern protectorates. On May 9, 1913,
Lugard submitted a formal proposal to the
Colonial Office in which Northern and Southern
provinces would have separate
administrations, under the control of a
"strongly authoritarian" Governor-General. The
Colonial Office approved most of Lugard's
plan, but balked at authorizing him to pass
laws without their approval. [51] John Anderson
diplomatically suggested:
The task of unification was achieved on the
eve of World War I. From January 1914
onwards, the newly united colony and
protectorate was presided over by a proconsul ,
who was entitled the Governor-General of
Nigeria . The militias and RWAFF battalions
were reorganized into the RWAFF Nigeria
Regiment .[52]
Lugard's governmental model for Nigeria was
unique and there was apparently not much
planning for its future development. Colonial
official A. J. Harding commented in 1913:
The Colonial Office accepted Lugard's proposal
that the Governor not be required to stay in-
country full-time; consequently, as Governor,
Lugard spent four months out of the year in
London. This scheme proved unpopular and
confusing to many involved parties and was
phased out. [53]
Yoruba sculpture from colonial period
depicting the British technique of
indirect rule
Emir of Kano, with cavalry,
photographed in 1911
The Protectorate was centrally administered by
the Colonial Civil Service, staffed by Britishers
and Africans called the British Native Staff—
many of whom originated from outside the
territory. Under the Political Department of the
Civil Service were Residents and District
Officers, responsible for overseeing operations
in each region. The Resident also oversaw a
Provincial Court at the region's capital. [54]
Each region also had a Native Administration,
staffed by locals, and possessing a Native
Treasury. The Native Administration was
headed by the traditional rulers —emirs in the
north—and his District Heads, who oversaw a
larger number of Village Heads. Native
Administration was responsible for police,
hospitals, public works, and local courts. The
Colonial Civil Service used intermediaries, as
the Royal Niger Company had, in an expanded
role which included diplomacy, propaganda,
and espionage. [55]
Half of all taxes went to the colonial
government and half went to the Native
Treasury. The Treasury used a planned budget
for payment of staff and development of public
works projects, and therefore could not be
spent at the discretion of the local emir.
Herbert Richmond Palmer developed details of
this model from 1906–1911 as the governor of
Northern Nigeria after Lugard. [56]
In 1916 Lugard formed the Nigerian Council, a
consultative body that brought together six
traditional leaders—including the Sultan of
Sokoto , the Emir of Kano , and the King of
Benin—to represent all parts of the colony. The
council was promoted as a device for allowing
the expression of opinions that could instruct
the Governor-General. In practice, Lugard used
the annual sessions to inform the traditional
leaders of British policy, leaving them with no
functions at the council's meetings except to
listen and to assent.
Unification meant only the loose affiliation of
three distinct regional administrations into
which Nigeria was subdivided—northern,
western, and eastern regions (see fig. 6). Each
was under a lieutenant governor and provided
independent government services. The
governor was, in effect, the coordinator for
virtually autonomous entities that had
overlapping economic interests but little in
common politically or socially. In the Northern
Region, the colonial government took careful
account of Islam and avoided any appearance
of a challenge to traditional values that might
incite resistance to British rule. [57]
This system, in which the structure of authority
focused on the emir to whom obedience was a
mark of religious devotion, did not welcome
change. As the emirs settled more and more
into their role as reliable agents of indirect
rule, colonial authorities were content to
maintain the status quo, particularly in
religious matters. Christian missionaries were
barred, and the limited government efforts in
education were harmonized with Islamic
institutions. [57]
In the south, by contrast, traditional leaders
were employed as vehicles of indirect rule in
EdoLand & Yorubaland, but Christianity and
Western education undermined their sacerdotal
functions. In some instances, however, a
double allegiance—to the idea of sacred
monarchy for its symbolic value and to modern
concepts of law and administration—was
maintained. Out of reverence for traditional
kingship, for instance, the Oba of Benin, whose
office was closely identified with Edo religion,
was accepted as the sponsor of a Yoruba
political movement. In the Eastern Region,
appointed officials who were given "warrants"
and hence called warrant chiefs, were strongly
resisted by the people because they lacked
traditional claims.
In practice, British administrative procedures
under indirect rule entailed constant interaction
between colonial authorities and local rulers—
the system was modified to fit the needs of
each region. In the north, for instance,
legislation took the form of a decree cosigned
by the governor and the emir, while in the
south, the governor sought the approval of the
Legislative Council. Hausa was recognized as
an official language in the north, and
knowledge of it was expected of colonial
officers serving there. In the South, only
English had official status. Regional
administrations also varied widely in the
quality of local personnel and in the scope of
the operations they were willing to undertake.
British staffs in each region continued to
operate according to procedures developed
before unification. Economic links among the
regions increased, but indirect rule tended to
discourage political interchange. There was
virtually no pressure for greater unity among
the regions until after the end of World War II.
Public works, such as harbour dredging and
road and railway construction, opened Nigeria
to economic development. British soap and
cosmetics manufacturers tried to obtain land
concessions for growing oil palms, but these
were refused. Instead, the companies had to
be content with a monopoly of the export trade
in these products. Other commercial crops,
such as cocoa and rubber, were encouraged,
and tin was mined on the Jos Plateau.
The only significant interruption in economic
development arose from natural disaster—the
great drought of 1913-14. Recovery came
quickly and improvements in port facilities and
the transportation infrastructure during World
War I furthered economic development.
Nigerian recruits participated in the war effort
as laborers and soldiers. The Nigeria Regiment
of the RWAFF, integrating troops from the
north and south, saw action against German
colonial forces in Cameroon and in German
East Africa.
During the war, the colonial government
earmarked a large portion of the Nigerian
budget as a contribution to imperial defense.
To raise additional revenues, Lugard took steps
to institute a uniform tax structure patterned
on the traditional system that he had adopted
in the north during his tenure there. Taxes
became a source of discontent in the south,
however, and contributed to disturbances
protesting British policy. In 1920 portions of
former German Cameroon were mandated to
Britain by the League of Nations and were
administered as part of Nigeria.
Until he stepped down as Governor-General in
1918, Lugard primarily was concerned with
consolidating British sovereignty and with
assuring local administration through
traditional leaders. He was contemptuous of
the educated and Westernised African elite
found more in the South, and he recommended
transferring the capital from Lagos, the
cosmopolitan city where the influence of these
people was most pronounced, to Kaduna in the
north. Although the capital was not moved,
Lugard's bias in favor of the Muslim north was
clear at the time. Lugard bequeathed to his
successor a prosperous colony when his term
as Governor-General expired.
The policy of indirect rule used in Northern
Nigeria became a model for British colonies
elsewhere in Africa. [59]
Flag of British Colonial Nigeria
Sculptural representation of Africa at
the Colonial Office building on
Whitehall street; created by Henry
Hugh Armstead
Lugard's immediate successor, Sir Hugh
Clifford, was an aristocratic professional
administrator with liberal instincts who had
won recognition for his enlightened
governorship of the Gold Coast . The
approaches of the two governors to colonial
development were diametrically opposed. In
contrast to Lugard, Clifford argued that
colonial government had the responsibility to
introduce as quickly as practical the benefits
of Western experience. He was aware that the
Muslim north would present problems, but he
had hopes for progress along the lines which
he laid down in the south, where he
anticipated "general emancipation" leading to a
more representative form of government.
Clifford emphasized economic development,
encouraging enterprises by immigrant
southerners in the north while restricting
European participation to capital intensive
activity.
Uneasy with the amount of latitude allowed
traditional leaders under indirect rule, Clifford
opposed further extension of the judicial
authority held by the northern emirs. He said
that he did "not consider that their past
traditions and their present backward cultural
conditions afford to any such experiment a
reasonable chance of success." [60] In the
south, he saw the possibility of building an
elite educated in schools modeled on a
European method (and numerous elite children
attended high-ranking colleges in Britain during
the colonial years). These schools would teach
"the basic principles that would and should
regulate character and conduct." [60] In line
with this attitude, he rejected Lugard's
proposal for moving the capital from Lagos,
the stronghold of the elite in whom he placed
so much confidence for the future.
Clifford also believed that indirect rule
encouraged centripetal tendencies. He argued
that the division into two separate colonies
was advisable unless a stronger central
government could bind Nigeria into more than
just an administrative convenience for the
three regions. Whereas Lugard had applied
lessons learned in the north to the
administration of the south, Clifford was
prepared to extend to the north practices that
had been successful in the south. Sir
Richmond Palmer , acting as Lieutenant-
Governor in the North, disagreed with Clifford
and advocated the principles of Lugard and
further decentralisation. [57]
The Colonial Office, where Lugard was still
held in high regard, accepted that changes
might be due in the south, but it forbade
fundamental alteration of procedures in the
north. A.J. Harding, director of Nigerian affairs
at the Colonial Office, defined the official
position of the British government in support of
indirect rule when he said that "direct
government by impartial and honest men of
alien race . . . never yet satisfied a nation long
and . . . under such a form of government, as
wealth and education increase, so do political
discontent and sedition." [60]
Economics and finance
Looms in Lagos, photographed in 1910–1913
by H. Hunting of the Patterson Zuchonis
trading company
The British treasury initially supported the
landlocked Northern Nigeria Protectorate with
grants, totaling £250,000 or more each year.
[61] Its revenue quickly increased, from £4,424
in 1901 to £274,989 in 2010. The Southern
Protectorate financed itself from the outset,
with revenue increasing from £361,815 to
£1,933,235 over the same period. [62]
After establishing political control of the
country, the British implemented a system of
taxation in order to force the indigenous
Africans to shift from subsistence farming to
wage labor . Sometimes forced labor was used
directly for public works projects. These
policies met with ongoing resistance[63][64]
Much of the colony's budget went to
payments of its military, the Royal West
African Frontier Force (RWAFF). [65] In 1936, of
£6,259,547 income for the Nigerian state,
£1,156,000 went back to England as home pay
for British officials in the Nigerian civil service.
[66]
Oil exploration began in 1906 under John
Simon Bergheim's Nigeria Bitumen
Corporation, to which the Colonial Office
granted exclusive rights. In 1907, the
Corporation received a loan of £25,000,
repayable upon discovery of oil. Other firms
applying for licenses were rejected. In
November 1908, Bergheim reported striking oil;
in September 1909, he reported extracting
2,000 barrels per day. However, development
of the Nigerian oilfields slowed when Bergheim
died in a car crash in September 1912. Lugard,
replacing Egerton as governor, aborted the
project in May 1913. The British turned to
Persia for oil. [67]
European traders in Nigeria initially made
widespread use of cowrie , which was already
valued locally. The influx of cowrie lead to
inflation.
Emergence of Southern
Nigerian nationalism
British colonialism created Nigeria, joining
diverse peoples and regions in an artificial
political entity along the Niger River. The
nationalism that became a political factor in
Nigeria during the interwar period derived both
from an older political particularism and broad
pan-Africanism, rather than from any sense
among the people of a common Nigerian
nationality. The goal of activists initially was
not self-determination, but increased
participation on a regional level in the
governmental process.
Inconsistencies in British policy reinforced
existing cleavages based on regional
animosities, as the British tried both to
preserve the indigenous cultures of each area
and to introduce modern technology, and
Western political and social concepts. In the
north, appeals to Islamic legitimacy upheld the
rule of the emirs, so that nationalist
sentiments were related to Islamic ideals.
Modern nationalists in the south, whose
thinking was shaped by European ideas,
opposed indirect rule, as they believed that it
had strengthened what they considered an
anachronistic ruling class and shut out the
emerging Westernised elite.
The southern nationalists were inspired by a
variety of sources, including such prominent
American-based activists as Marcus Garvey
and W.E.B. Du Bois. Nigerian students abroad,
particularly at British schools, joined those
from other colonies in pan-African groups,
such as the West African Students Union,
founded in London in 1925. Early nationalists
tended to ignore Nigeria as the focus of
patriotism. Their common denominators
tended to be based on newly assertive ethnic
consciousness, particularly that of the Yoruba
and Igbo. Despite acceptance of European and
North American influences, the nationalists
were critical of colonialism for its failure to
appreciate the antiquity, richness and
complexity of indigenous cultures. They wanted
self-government, charging that only colonial
rule prevented the unshackling of progressive
forces in Nigeria and other states.
Political opposition to colonial rule often
assumed religious dimensions. Independent
Christian churches had emerged at the end of
the nineteenth century. European
interpretations of Christian orthodoxy in some
cases refused to allow the incorporation of
local customs and practices, although the
various mission denominations interpreted
Christianity in different ways. Most Europeans
tended to overlook their own differences and
were surprised and shocked that Nigerians
wanted to develop new denominations
independent of European control. Protestant
sects had flourished in Christianity since the
Reformation; the emergence of independent
Christian churches in Nigeria (as of black
denominations in the United States) was
another phase of this history. The pulpits of
the independent congregations became
avenues for the free expression of critics of
colonial rule.
Colonial Lagos circa 1910
In the 1920s, Nigerians began to form a
variety of associations, such as professional
and business associations, such as the
Nigerian Union of Teachers; the Nigerian Law
Association, which brought together lawyers,
many of whom had been educated in Britain;
and the Nigerian Produce Traders' Association,
led by Obafemi Awolowo. While initially
organized for professional and fraternal
reasons, these were centers of educated people
who had chances to develop their leadership
skills in the organizations, as well as form
broad social networks.
Ethnic and kinship organizations that often
took the form of a tribal union also emerged in
the 1920s. These organizations were primarily
urban phenomena that arose after numerous
rural migrants moved to the cities. Alienated
by the anonymity of the urban environment
and drawn together by ties to their ethnic
homelands—as well as by the need for mutual
aid—the new city dwellers formed local clubs
that later expanded into federations covering
whole regions. By the mid-1940s, the major
ethnic groups had formed such associations as
the Igbo Federal Union and the Egbe Omo
Oduduwa (Society of the Descendants of
Oduduwa), a Yoruba cultural movement, in
which Awolowo played a leading role. In some
cases, British assignment of people to ethnic
groups, and treatment based along ethnic
lines, led to identification with ethnicity where
none had existed before. [68]
A third type of organization that was more
pointedly political was the youth or student
group, which became the vehicle of
intellectuals and professionals. They were the
most politically conscious segment of the
population and created the vanguard of the
nationalist movement. Newspapers, some of
which were published before World War I,
provided coverage of nationalist views.
The 1922 constitution provided Nigerians the
chance to elect a handful of representatives to
the Legislative Council. The principal figure in
the political activity that ensued was Herbert
Macauley , often referred to as the father of
Nigerian nationalism. He aroused political
awareness through his newspaper, the Lagos
Daily News . He also led the Nigerian National
Democratic Party (NNDP), which dominated
elections in Lagos from its founding in 1922
until the ascendancy of the National Youth
Movement (NYM) in 1938. His political
platform called for economic and educational
development, Africanization of the civil service,
and self-government for Lagos. Significantly,
Macauley's NNDP remained almost entirely a
Lagos party, popular only in the area whose
people already had experience in elective
politics.
The National Youth Movement (NYM) used
nationalist rhetoric to agitate for improvements
in education. The movement brought to public
notice a long list of future leaders, including
H.O. Davies and Nnamdi Azikiwe. Although
Azikiwe later came to be recognized as the
leading spokesman for national unity, when he
first returned from university training in the
United States, his outlook was pan-African
rather than nationalist, and emphasized the
common African struggle against European
colonialism. (This was also reflective of
growing pan-Africanism among American
activists of the time.) Azikiwe had less interest
in purely Nigerian goals than did Davies, a
student of Harold Laski at the London School
of Economics, whose political orientation was
considered left-wing.
By 1938 the NYM was agitating for dominion
status within the British Commonwealth of
Nations, so that Nigeria would have the same
status as Canada and Australia. In elections
that year, the NYM ended the domination of
the NNDP in the Legislative Council and
worked to establish a national network of
affiliates. Three years later internal divisions
arose that were dominated by major ethnic
loyalties. The departure of Azikiwe and other
Igbo members of the NYM left the organization
in Yoruba hands. During World War II, Awolowo
reorganized it as a predominantly Yoruba
political party, the Action Group. Yoruba-Igbo
rivalry became increasingly important in
Nigerian politics (see Ethnic Relations, ch. 2).
During World War II, three battalions of the
Nigeria Regiment fought in the Ethiopian
campaign. Nigerian units also contributed to
two divisions serving with British forces in
Palestine, Morocco, Sicily, and Burma, where
they won many honors. Wartime experiences
provided a new frame of reference for many
soldiers, who interacted across ethnic
boundaries in ways that were unusual in
Nigeria. The war also made the British
reappraise Nigeria's political future. The war
years, brought a polarization between the
older, more parochial leaders inclined toward
gradualism and the younger intellectuals, who
thought in more immediate terms.
The rapid growth of organized labour in the
1940s also brought new political forces into
play. During the war, union membership
increased sixfold to 30,000. The proliferation of
labor organizations fragmented the movement,
and potential leaders lacked the experience and
skill to draw workers together.
The Action Group was largely the creation of
Awolowo, general secretary of Egbe Omo
Oduduwa and leader of the Nigerian Produce
Traders' Association. The Action Group was
thus the heir of a generation of flourishing
cultural consciousness among the Yoruba and
also had valuable connections with commercial
interests that were representative of the
comparative economic advancement of the
Western Region. Awolowo had little difficulty in
appealing to broad segments of the Yoruba
population, but he worked to avoid the Action
Group from being stigmatized as a "tribal"
group. Despite his somewhat successful efforts
to enlist non-Yoruba support, the regionalist
sentiment that had stimulated the party
initially continued.
Segments of the Yoruba community had their
own animosities and new rivalries arose. For
example, many people in Ibadan opposed
Awolowo on personal grounds because of his
identification with the Ijebu Yoruba. Despite
these difficulties, the Action Group rapidly built
an effective organization. Its program reflected
greater planning and was more ideologically
oriented than that of the NCNC . Although
lacking Azikiwe's compelling personality,
Awolowo was a formidable debater as well as
a vigorous and tenacious political campaigner.
He used for the first time in Nigeria modern,
sometimes flamboyant, electioneering
techniques. Among his leading lieutenants
were Samuel Akintola of Ibadan and the Oni of
Ife.
The Action Group consistently supported
minority-group demands for autonomous
states within a federal structure, as well as the
severance of a midwest state from the Western
Region. It assumed that comparable
alterations would be made elsewhere, an
attitude that won the party minority voting
support in the other regions. It backed Yoruba
irredentism in the Fulani-ruled emirate of Ilorin
in the Northern Region, and separatist
movements among non-Igbo in the Eastern
Region.
The Northern People's Congress (NPC) was
organized in the late 1940s by a small group
of Western-educated Northern Nigerians. They
had obtained the assent of the emirs to form a
political party to counterbalance the activities
of the southern-based parties. It represented a
substantial element of reformism in the North.
The most powerful figure in the party was
Ahmadu Bello, the sardauna (war leader) of
Sokoto.
Bello wanted to protect northern social and
political institutions from southern influence.
He insisted on maintaining the territorial
integrity of the Northern Region. He was
prepared to introduce educational and
economic changes to strengthen the north.
Although his own ambitions were limited to
the Northern Region, Bello backed the NPC's
successful efforts to mobilize the north's large
voting strength so as to win control of the
national government.
The NPC platform emphasized the integrity of
the north, its traditions, religion, and social
order. Support for broad Nigerian concerns
occupied a clear second place. A lack of
interest in extending the NPC beyond the
Northern Region corresponded to this strictly
regional orientation. Its activist membership
was drawn from local government and emirate
officials who had access to means of
communication and to repressive traditional
authority that could keep the opposition in line.
The small contingent of northerners who had
been educated abroad—a group that included
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and Aminu Kano —
was allied with British-backed efforts to
introduce gradual change to the emirates. The
emirs gave support to limited modernization
largely from fears of the unsettling presence of
southerners in the north, and by observing the
improvements in living conditions in the South.
Northern leaders committed to modernization
were also firmly connected to the traditional
power structure. Most internal problems were
concealed, and open opposition to the
domination of the Muslim aristocracy was not
tolerated. Critics, including representatives of
the middle belt who resented Muslim
domination, were relegated to small, peripheral
parties or to inconsequential separatist
movements. [69]
In 1950 Aminu Kano, who had been
instrumental in founding the NPC, broke away
to form the Northern Elements Progressive
Union (NEPU), in protest against the NPC's
limited objectives and what he regarded as a
vain hope that traditional rulers would accept
modernization. NEPU formed a parliamentary
alliance with the NCNC.
The NPC continued to represent the interests
of the traditional order in the pre-independence
deliberations. After the defection of Kano, the
only significant disagreement within the NPC
was related to moderates. Men such as
Balewa believed that only by overcoming
political and economic backwardness could the
NPC protect the foundations of traditional
northern authority against the influence of the
more advanced south.
In all three regions, minority parties
represented the special interests of ethnic
groups, especially as they were affected by the
majority. They never were able to elect
sizeable legislative delegations, but they served
as a means of public expression for minority
concerns. They received attention from major
parties before elections, at which time either a
dominant party from another region or the
opposition party in their region sought their
alliance.
The political parties jockeyed for positions of
power in anticipation of the independence of
Nigeria. Three constitutions were enacted from
1946 to 1954. While each generated
considerable political controversy, they moved
the country toward greater internal autonomy,
with an increasing role for the political parties.
The trend was toward the establishment of a
parliamentary system of government, with
regional assemblies and a federal House of
Representatives.
In 1946 a new constitution was approved by
the British Parliament at Westminster and
promulgated in Nigeria. Although it reserved
effective power in the hands of the Governor-
General and his appointed Executive Council ,
the so-called Richards Constitution (after
Governor-General Sir Arthur Richards , who was
responsible for its formulation) provided for an
expanded Legislative Council empowered to
deliberate on matters affecting the whole
country. Separate legislative bodies, the
houses of assembly, were established in each
of the three regions to consider local questions
and to advise the lieutenant governors. The
introduction of the federal principle, with
deliberative authority devolved on the regions,
signaled recognition of the country's diversity.
Although realistic in its assessment of the
situation in Nigeria, the Richards Constitution
undoubtedly intensified regionalism as an
alternative to political unification.
The pace of constitutional change accelerated
after the promulgation of the Richards
Constitution. It was suspended in 1950
against a call for greater autonomy, which
resulted in an inter-parliamentary conference
at Ibadan in 1950. The conference drafted the
terms of a new constitution. The so-called
Macpherson Constitution , after the incumbent
Governor-General, went into effect the
following year.
The most important innovations in the new
charter reinforced the dual course of
constitutional evolution, allowing for both
regional autonomy and federal union. By
extending the elective principle and by
providing for a central government with a
Council of Ministers, the Macpherson
Constitution gave renewed impetus to party
activity and to political participation at the
national level. But by providing for comparable
regional governments exercising broad
legislative powers, which could not be
overridden by the newly established 185-seat
federal House of Representatives, the
Macpherson Constitution also gave a
significant boost to regionalism. Subsequent
revisions contained in the Lyttleton
Constitution , enacted in 1954, firmly
established the federal principle and paved the
way for independence.
In 1957 the Western and the Eastern regions
became formally self-governing under the
parliamentary system. Similar status was
acquired by the Northern Region two years
later. There were numerous differences of
detail among the regional systems, but all
adhered to parliamentary forms and were
equally autonomous in relation to the federal
government at Lagos. The federal government
retained specified powers, including
responsibility for banking, currency, external
affairs, defense, shipping and navigation, and
communications, but real political power was
centered in the regions. Significantly, the
regional governments controlled public
expenditures derived from revenues raised
within each region.
Ethnic cleavages intensified in the 1950s.
Political activists in the southern areas spoke
of self-government in terms of educational
opportunities and economic development.
Because of the spread of mission schools and
wealth derived from export crops, the southern
parties were committed to policies that would
benefit the south of the country. In the north,
the emirs intended to maintain firm control on
economic and political change.
Any activity in the north that might include
participation by the federal government (and
consequently by southern civil servants) was
regarded as a challenge to the primacy of the
emirates. Broadening political participation and
expanding educational opportunities and other
social services also were viewed as threats to
the status quo. An extensive immigrant
population of southerners, especially Igbo,
already were living in the north; they
dominated clerical positions and were active in
many trades.
The cleavage between the Yoruba and the Igbo
was accentuated by their competition for
control of the political machinery. The receding
British presence enabled local officials and
politicians to gain access to patronage over
government jobs, funds for local development,
market permits, trade licenses, government
contracts, and even scholarships for higher
education. In an economy with many qualified
applicants for every post, great resentment
was generated by any favoritism that
authorities showed to members of their own
ethnic group.
In the immediate post-World War II period,
Nigeria benefited from a favourable trade
balance. Although per capita income in the
country as a whole remained low by
international standards, rising incomes among
salaried personnel and burgeoning urbanization
expanded consumer demand for imported
goods.
In the meantime, public sector spending
increased even more dramatically than export
earnings. It was supported not only by the
income from huge agricultural surpluses but
also by a new range of direct and indirect
taxes imposed during the 1950s. The transfer
of responsibility for budgetary management
from the central to the regional governments in
1954 accelerated the pace of public spending
on services and on development projects. Total
revenues of central and regional governments
nearly doubled in relation to the gross
domestic product (GDP—see Glossary) during
the decade.
The most dramatic event having a long-term
effect on Nigeria's economic development, was
the discovery and exploitation of petroleum
deposits. The search for oil, begun in 1908 and
abandoned a few years later, was revived in
1937 by Shell and British Petroleum.
Exploration was intensified in 1946, but the
first commercial discovery did not occur until
1956, at Olobiri in the Niger Delta. In 1958
exportation of Nigerian oil was initiated at
facilities constructed at Port Harcourt. Oil
income was still marginal, but the prospects
for continued economic expansion appeared
bright and accentuated political rivalries on the
eve of independence.
The election of the House of Representatives
after the adoption of the 1954 constitution
gave the NPC a total of seventy-nine seats, all
from the Northern Region. Among the other
major parties, the NCNC took fifty-six seats,
winning a majority in both the Eastern and the
Western regions, while the Action Group
captured only twenty-seven seats. The NPC
was called on to form a government, but the
NCNC received six of the ten ministerial posts.
Three of these posts were assigned to
representatives from each region, and one was
reserved for a delegate from the Northern
Cameroons.
As a further step toward independence, the
governor's Executive Council was merged with
the Council of Ministers in 1957 to form the
all-Nigerian Federal Executive Council. The
NPC federal parliamentary leader, Balewa, was
appointed prime minister. Balewa formed a
coalition government that included the Action
Group as well as the NCNC to prepare the
country for the final British withdrawal. His
government guided the country for the next
three years, operating with almost complete
autonomy in internal affairs.
The preparation of a new federal constitution
for an independent Nigeria was carried out at
conferences held at Lancaster House in
London in 1957 and 1958, which were presided
over by The Rt. Hon. Alan Lennox-Boyd , M.P. ,
the British Secretary of State for the Colonies.
Nigerian delegates were selected to represent
each region and to reflect various shades of
opinion. The delegation was led by Balewa of
the NPC and included party leaders Awolowo
of the Action Group, Azikiwe of the NCNC, and
Bello of the NPC; they were also the premiers
of the Western, Eastern, and Northern regions,
respectively. Independence was achieved on
October 1, 1960.
Elections were held for a new and greatly
enlarged House of Representatives in December
1959; 174 of the 312 seats were allocated to
the Northern Region on the basis of its larger
population. The NPC, entering candidates only
in the Northern Region, confined campaigning
largely to local issues but opposed the addition
of new regimes. The NCNC backed creation of
a midwest state and proposed federal control
of education and health services.
The Action Group, which staged a lively
campaign, favored stronger government and
the establishment of three new states, while
advocating creation of a West Africa Federation
that would unite Nigeria with Ghana and Sierra
Leone. The NPC captured 142 seats in the new
legislature. Balewa was called on to head a
NPC-NCNC coalition government, and
Awolowo became official leader of the
opposition.
Independent Nigeria (1960)
By a British Act of Parliament, Nigeria became
an independent country (as a Commonwealth
realm ) within the Commonwealth on October 1,
1960. Azikiwe was installed as Governor-
General of the federation and Balewa continued
to serve as head of a democratically elected
parliamentary, but now completely sovereign,
government. The Governor-General represented
the British monarch as head of state and was
appointed by the Crown on the advice of the
Nigerian Prime Minister in consultation with
the regional premiers. The Governor-General, in
turn, was responsible for appointing the Prime
Minister and for choosing a candidate from
among contending leaders when there was no
parliamentary majority. Otherwise, the
Governor-General's office was essentially
ceremonial.
The government was responsible to a
Parliament composed of the popularly elected
312-member House of Representatives and the
44-member Senate, chosen by the regional
legislatures.
In general, the regional constitutions followed
the federal model, both structurally and
functionally. The most striking departure was
in the Northern Region, where special
provisions brought the regional constitution
into consonance with Islamic law and custom.
The similarity between the federal and regional
constitutions was deceptive, however, and the
conduct of public affairs reflected wide
differences among the regions.
In February 1961, a plebiscite was conducted
to determine the disposition of the Southern
Cameroons and Northern Cameroons, which
were administered by Britain as United Nations
Trust Territories. By an overwhelming majority,
voters in the Southern Cameroons opted to
join formerly French-administered Cameroon
over integration with Nigeria as a separate
federated region. In the Northern Cameroons,
however, the largely Muslim electorate chose
to merge with Nigeria's Northern Region.
References
References
1. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), pp. 1–2. "Crown Colony Government in
Nigeria and elsewhere in the British Empire
was autocratic government. Officials at the
Colonial Office and colonial governors in the
field never pretended otherwise. In fact,
autocratic, bureaucratic rule was the true
legacy of British colonial government in Africa."
2. ^ Carland (1985), The Colonial Office and
Nigeria , p. 48.
3. ^ a b c d e f g Robin Hermann, "Empire
Builders and Mushroom Gentlemen: The
Meaning of Money in Colonial Nigeria",
International Journal of African Historical
Studies 44.3, 2011.
4. ^ a b c d e Ken Swindell, "The Commercial
Development of the North: Company and
Government Relations, 1900–1906", Paideuma
40, 1994, pp. 149–162.
5. ^ a b Carland, The Colonial Office and
Nigeria (1985), p. 90.
6. ^ a b c David Richardson, "Background to
annexation: Anglo-African credit relations in
the Bight of Biafra, 1700–1891"; in Pétré-
Grenouilleau, From Slave Trade to Empire
(2004), pp. 47–68.
7. ^ See Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations
(1776), Vol. 2 p. 112 . (Quoted in Richardson,
2004). "Though the Europeans possess many
considerable settlements both upon the coast
of Africa and in the East Indies, they have not
yet established in either of those countries
such numerous and thriving colonies as those
in the islands and continent of America."
8. ^ Isichei, A History of Nigeria (1983), p.
362.
9. ^ David Etlis, "African and European
relations in the last century of the transatlantic
slave trade"; in Pétré-Grenouilleau, From Slave
Trade to Empire (2004), pp. 21–46.
10. ^ Randy J. Sparks, The Two Princes of
Calabar: An Eighteenth-Century Atlantic
Odyssey ; Harvard University Press, 2004; ISBN
0-674-01312-3 ; Chapter 1: " A Very Bloody
Transaction: Old Calabar and the Massacre of
1767 ".
11. ^ a b c d e f Anietie A. Inyang & Manasseh
Edidem Bassey, "Imperial Treaties and the
Origins of British Colonial Rule in Southern
Nigeria, 1860-1890", Mediterranean Journal of
Social Sciences 5.20, September 2014.
12. ^ Asiegbu, Nigeria and its British Invaders
(1984), p. xxiii. "After the Abolition Act in 1807
making the trade in African slaves illegal for
British subjects, Britain did not stop there: For
the next quarter of a century successive British
Governments embarked on a kind of
aggressive diplomacy, bullying and bribing
other European nations, especially Spain and
Portugal, to toe the anti-slavery line with
England. / On the West African Coast itself
British anti-slavery policy became very evident
not only in the establishment of the free
colony or Settlement of Freetown in Sierra
Leone for the recaptives or freed slaves. A
detachment of the all-powerful British Navy,
the West African naval squadron, was
stationed in West African waters to patrol
along the coastline and to intercept any slave
ships or vessels equipped for the slave trade,
and to bring slave vessels captured for trial
before British controlled courts in Freetown. At
the same time Britain embarked on securing
from African rulers, in consideration of
payments to these rulers, what became known
as anti-slave trade treaties. By these treaties
the rulers engaged to stop the traffic in slaves
in their respective territories. In the process of
enforcing these anti-slave trade policies on the
west coast with its powerful navy Britain
discovered the military weakness or inferiority
of the African states in relation to its own
military power."
13. ^ a b Olatunji Ojo, "The Organization of the
Atlantic Slave Trade in Yorubaland, ca.1777 to
ca.1856", International Jounral of African
Historical Studies 41.1, 2008. "Slave
production in the interior raised exports from
Lagos ten fold, making it West Africa's leading
slave port. The most accurate trade figures are
found in the Trans-Atlantic slave voyage
database (TSD), which put the number of
slave exports between 1776 and 1850 at
308,800. Of that number only 24,000 slaves
were shipped before 1801, while 114,200 and
170,600 were sold during 1801–25 and 1826–
50, respectively. Exports from Badagry lagged
far behind, with about 37,400 slaves sold
during 1776–1860."
14. ^ Asiegbu, Nigeria and its British Invaders
(1984), pp. xiv–xv. "Here again, European and
African scholars have been at loggerheads and
in the same kinds of conflicts as had featured
in their interpretations of the primary motives
of the British anti-slavery movement and
abolitionism in the mid-19th century, namely,
British self-interest or imperial ambitions on
the one hand, and British humanitarian feeling
for Africa on the other hand."
15. ^ Tamuno, The Evolution of the Nigerian
State (1972), p. 6. "To the British, traffic in
human beings after 1807 was both
'uncivilised' and illegal. As the century went
on, a strong feeling developed that the slave
trade, as an aspect of piracy, stood
condemned in international and municipal law.
This change in moral tone over the slave trade
at first seemed incomprehensible to
generations of people in Southern Nigeria who
within a relatively short period were presented
with two different concepts of right and wrong.
Their scepticism about the correctness of such
conflicting standards persisted into the early
twentieth century."
16. ^ Warren Whatley & Rob Gillezeau, " The
Impact of the Slave Trade on African
Economies ", World Economic History
Congress, Utrecht, May 23, 2009.
17. ^ Helen Chapin Metz, ed. "Influence of
Christian Missions" , Nigeria: A Country
Study, Washington: GPO for the Library of
Congress, 1991, accessed 18 April 2012
18. ^ Tamuno, The Evolution of the Nigerian
State (1972), pp. 11–12.
19. ^ a b Bouda Etemad, "Economic relations
between Europe and Black Africa c . 1780–
1938"; in Pétré-Grenouilleau, From Slave Trade
to Empire (2004), pp. 69–81.
20. ^ Tamuno, The Evolution of the Nigerian
State (1972), p. 14. "The most significant
economic development in Southern Nigeria
since 1807 was the transition from the pre-
colonial emphasis on subsistence agriculture
to an increasing concentration on production
for sale."
21. ^ a b Carland, The Colonial Office and
Nigeria (1985), p. 2.
22. ^ a b c Asiegbu, Nigeria and its British
Invaders (1984), pp. xxv. "In the Lagos Colony
Captain John Glover, as administrator of the
Colony, created between 1861 and 1862 the
famous Hausa militia ('Glover's Hausas')
which became the nucleus of the Lagos
Constabulary (itself splitting after 1895 into
two bodies, one a civil police force, the other a
military unit). The earliest recruits into the
Lagos militia came from the liberated African
yard or depot which glover had established in
the Colony for the reception of run-away
domestic slaves from the surrounding local
communities. In the Niger territories, the Royal
Niger Company organized its own constabulary
forces between 1886 and 1899; at the Niger
Coast Protectorate the Consular
Administration, with its headquarters at
Calabar, established after 1891 the Niger
Coast Protectorate Force or Constabulary,
sometimes known as the 'Oil Rivers
Irregulars' (which under Consul Annesley
acquired the name of the 'forty thieves'). Thus
by 1897 when the WAFF was created, British
West Africa had in some form or other known,
like French West Africa, almost half a century
of European or British military presence and
activity."
23. ^ Tamuno, The Evolution of the Nigerian
State (1972), pp. 15.
24. ^ "Northern Nigeria: The Illo Canceller and
Borgu Mail" by Ray Harris in Cameo, Vol. 14,
No. 3, Whole No. 90, October 2013, pp.
158-160.
25. ^ Afeadie, "The Hidden Hand of
Overrule" (1996), p. 10–12.
26. ^ Afeadie, "The Hidden Hand of
Overrule" (1996), p. 12–13. "Specifically, the
Company sought to secure the cooperation of
the traditional rulers in ensuring peaceful
conditions for trade. For this objective, the
Company chose to administer the African
inhabitants of the Niger Sudan through their
traditional rulers and their political institutions.
[…] They needed special personnel: such
officials who knew the local conditions and
who could communicate between the Company
and the indigenous people. […] These
intermediaries assisted government diplomacy
and helped to establish and maintain relations
between the company and the traditional
rulers. They gathered information which was
needed for policy-making in administration.
Some of them also manned Company stations
and served as District Agents."
27. ^ Afeadie, "The Hidden Hand of
Overrule" (1996), p. 13–15.
28. ^ Isichei, A History of Nigeria (1983), p.
372–373.
29. ^ Asiegbu, Nigeria and its British Invaders
(1984), pp. xiv, xxviii–xxx.
30. ^ Isichei, A History of Nigeria (1983), pp.
365–366.
31. ^ Tamuno, The Evolution of the Nigerian
State (1972), p. xiv.
32. ^ Isichei, A History of Nigeria (1983), p.
367.
33. ^ Isichei, A History of Nigeria (1983), pp.
367–368. "East of the Niger, where no obvious
and redoubtable foe existed, it was necessary
to invent one. Gradually, in the dispatches of
the 1890s, one sees the emergence of an
image of Arochukwu rather like that which
prevailed of Benin at the same time: a sinister
'fetish' power, deeply involved with slave
trading, indelibly opposed to European
penetration, and wielding a very great influence
over the politics of other states. One has the
suggestion that the Igbo were in need of
release from Aro tyranny, precisely the
suggestion which was made with reference to
Benin and the Sokoto Caliphate."
34. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), pp. 56–58. "And so, flying the flags of
civilisation and commerce, the Colonial Office
finally authorized the expedition to begin in
December 1901. Over the summer the Aros
conveniently made some slave raids on
neighbouring tribes, providing the Colonial
Office and the Southern Nigerian Government
with, as Nigeria Department member Butler
termed it, 'the technical justification for the
expedition' which, as he further noted, had
'already been decided to be necessary on more
general grounds'. The expedition began and
ended right on schedule."
35. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), pp. 58–59. "Moor's successor, Sir
Walter Egerton, quickly embarked on, with the
blessings of the Colonial Office, a policy of
sending out pacification patrols annually. For
the most part the patrols did not involve the
use of force so much as they did the threat of
force if submission was not made. At the
beginning of each dry season the Southern
Nigerian troops would establish a central base
on the edge of the area they were to take over.
Then small columns of soldiers would be sent
out to different parts of the unoccupied
country. Usually this show of force was
enough, and the area would soon be open for
the introduction of district administration and
commercial development."
36. ^ Isichei, A History of Nigeria (1983), p.
369–371.
37. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), pp. 60–62.
38. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), p. 64.
39. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), p. 68.
40. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), p. 50.
41. ^ Asiegbu, Nigeria and its British Invaders
(1984), pp. xxv–xxvii. "Right from the start
Lugard adopted a policy of keeping the entire
force predominantly Hausa, with Yorubas as
the next preferred ethnic group to recruit into
the force. By the middle of 1898 Lugard
reported to the Colonial Office that there were
already some 2600 native soldiers (made up of
Hausa and Yorubas in equal proportions) in the
force, while more vigorous recruiting
expeditions were being undertaken by
European officials into Yorubaland and
Northern Nigeria. [...] Adequate historical
information and knowledge about the
organization and exploits of the WAFF, the
military activities and experiences of some of
the remarkable personalities and individual
soldiers and officials who belonged to it, have
unfortunately been lacking in our own time
thanks to the strict official policy of secrecy
and silence which the British government
imposed right from the start on all officers
serving in, or retired from, that force."
42. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), pp. 3–4, 50–52.
43. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), pp. 19–22. "Those in the upper middle
class were in higher-income groups or in
important professional, commercial, or
industrial positions. / These definitions place
Colonial Office permanent officials primarily in
the upper middle class. This can be seen by
looking at Table 1.2 Three of these men —
William Baillie Hamilton, Dougal Malcolm, and
Charles Strachey — also had connections with
the nobility and landed gentry. Nine had
fathers in prestigious occupations — the
Church, the Bar, and the highest ranks of the
Civil Service and the armed forces; and the
remaining five had fathers in the important
professional, commercial, or industrial
positions."
44. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), p. 31.
45. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), p. 32–33.
46. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), pp. 35–37.
47. ^ a b Carland, The Colonial Office and
Nigeria (1985), pp. 104–109.
48. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), pp. 135–153.
49. ^ a b Carland, The Colonial Office and
Nigeria (1985), pp. 79–84.
50. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), p. 87. "Although permanent officials
like some, though not all, of Lugard's ideas,
they had built up considerable antipathy
toward Lugard during his tour of duty in
Northern Nigeria (1900–6). His unorthodox
and administratively untidy ways exasperated
them. However, Harcourt and Anderson
decided they could not have Lugard's ideas
without Lugard. In August 1911 Anderson told
Lugard that they were anxious to amalgamate
the Nigerian administrations; 'But our difficulty
is to get the right man for the job. We are
agreed that you are that man.'"
51. ^ a b Carland, The Colonial Office and
Nigeria (1985), p. 88–89.
52. ^ Asiegbu, Nigeria and its British Invaders
(1984), p. xxxi.
53. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), pp. 92–100.
54. ^ Afeadie, "The Hidden Hand of
Overrule" (1996), p. 17–19.
55. ^ Afeadie, "The Hidden Hand of
Overrule" (1996), p. 19–21. "The agents
performed similar but more expansive roles as
their Company counterparts. They were
instrumental in the development of government
diplomacy with the traditional rulers; they
spread government propaganda among the
indigenous peoplke; and they assisted colonial
officials in parleying with native forces at war
with government troops. Agents also collected
intelligence for the colonial officials; they
gathered information on public opinion and the
military resources of the local polities; they
also spied on rival colonial forces in foreign
territories."
56. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), pp. 70–71.
57. ^ a b c Sir Richmond Palmer
58. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), p. 67.
59. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), p. 66. "In British colonial
administrative history the importance of
indirect rule – in theory and in practice –
should not be underestimated. Indirect rule, as
it developed in Northern Nigeria before 1914,
became the most influential model for local
government in other British Crown Colonies. By
the 1930s practically all of British tropical
Africa, outside the urban areas, had accepted
indirect rule as the basic mode of local
government."
60. ^ a b c Helen Chapin Metz, ed. Nigeria: A
Country Study. Washington: GPO for the
Library of Congress, 1991. Retrieved October
11, 2014 from http://countrystudies.us/
nigeria/19.htm
61. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), pp. 85–86, 103.
62. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), p. 119.
63. ^ Isichei, A History of Nigeria (1983), pp.
386–388.
64. ^ Elliot J. Berg, "The Development of a
Labor Force in Sub-Saharan Africa"; Economic
Development and Cultural Change 13.4, July
1965.
65. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), pp. 127–128.
66. ^ Isichei, A History of Nigeria (1983), p.
380.
67. ^ Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria
(1985), pp. 184–198.
68. ^ Isichei, A History of Nigeria (1983), p.
392–393. "A Tiv political sociologist has
explored this theme in Tiv experience. As late
as the early 'thirties, a well informed observer
could state, 'I am not conscious of any race
consciousness among the Tiv except on the
very widest and vaguest basis . . .'. But this
soon changed. 'By its constant treatment of
the Tiv as a corporate body with homogenous
interests, the Native Administration went a
long way towards creating the level of ethnic
consciousness which developed. And
conversely, by imposing a Yoruba Muslim from
Bida as Chief of Makurdi, the British created a
wholly new demand for a Tiv Paramount Chief,
Tor Tiv. By the 1960s, ethnic consciousness
had become a key determinant of Tiv political
behaviour."
69. ^ Helen Chapin Metz, ed. Nigeria: A
Country Study. Washington: GPO for the
Library of Congress, 1991. Retrieved October
11, 2014 from http://countrystudies.us/
nigeria/20.htm
Sources
Country Studies On-Line - Nigeria at the
Library of Congress
Bibliography
Afeadie, Philip Atsu. "The Hidden Hand of
Overrule: Political Agents and the
Establishment of British Colonial Rule in
Northern Nigeria, 1886–1914". PhD
dissertation accepted at the Graduate
Programme in History, York University, Ontario.
September 1996.
Asiegbu, Johnson U. J. Nigeria and its
British Invaders, 1851–1920: A Thematic
Documentary History. New York & Enugu: Nok
Publishers International, 1984. ISBN
0-88357-101-3
Carland, John M. The Colonial Office and
Nigeria, 1898–1914 . Hoover Institution Press,
Stanford University, 1985. ISBN
0-8179-8141-1
Falola, Toyin, & Matthew M. Heaton, A
History of Nigeria , Cambridge, 2008, ISBN
978-0-521-68157-5
Isichei, Elizabeth. A History of Nigeria .
Harlow, UK, and New York: Longman, Inc.,
1983. ISBN 0-582-64331-7
Pétré-Grenouilleau, Olivier (ed.). From Slave
Trade to Empire: Europe and the colonisation
of Black Africa 1780s–1880s. Abingdon, UK,
and New York: Routledge, 2004. ISBN
0-714-65691-7
Tamuno, T. N. The Evolution of the Nigerian
State: The Southern Phase, 1898–1914 . New
York: Humanities Press, 1972. SBN 391 00232
5
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Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria
British colony


1914–1960 →
Flag of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria
Anthem
God Save the King /God Save the Queen
Nigeria (red)
British possessions in Africa (pink)
1914
Capital Lagos
Languages English
Government British Crown colony
High Commissioner /
Governor
- 1914–1919 Sir Frederick John
Dealtry Lugard
- 1948–1954 Sir John Stuart
Macpherson
History
- Established 1 January 1914
- Disestablished 1 October 1960
Currency British West African
pound (1914–1958)
Nigerian Pound (from
1958)
Slave trade and abolition
Missionaries
Commerce
Exploration
Lagos Colony
Oil Rivers Protectorate
We, the undersigned King and
Chiefs...with the view to the
bettering of the condition of
our country and people, do
this day cede to the National
Africa Company (Limited),
their heirs and assigns,
forever, the whole of our
territory...We also give the
said National African
Company (Limited) full power
to settle all native disputes
arising from any cause
whatever, and we pledge
ourselves not to enter into any
war with other tribes without
the sanction of the said
National Africa Company
(Limited).
We also understand that the
said National African
Company (limited) have full
power to mine, farm, and
build in any portion of our
territory. We bind ourselves
not to have any intercourse
with any strangers or
foreigners except through the
said national African
Company (Limited), and we
give the said National African
Company (Limited) full power
to exclude all other strangers
and foreigners from their
territory at their discretion.
In consideration of the
foregoing, the said National
African Company (Limited)
bind themselves not to
interfere with any of the
native laws or customs of the
country, consistently with the
maintenance of order and
good government...[and]
agree to pay native owners of
land a reasonable amount for
any portion they may require.
The said National African
Company (Limited) bind
themselves to protect the said
King and Chiefs from the
attacks of any neighbouring
tribes (Ibid.). [11]


The Fulani in old times . . .
conquered this country. They
took the right to rule over it,
to levy taxes, to depose kings
and to create kings. They in
turn have by defeat lost their
rule which has come into the
hands of the British. All these
things which I have said the
Fulani by conquest took the
right to do now pass to the
British. Every Sultan and Emir
and the principal officers of
state will be appointed by the
high Commissioner throughout
all this country. The High
Commissioner will be guided
by all the usual laws of
succession and the wishes of
the people and chief, but will
set them aside if he desires for
good cause to do so. The Emirs
and chiefs who are appointed
will rule over the people as of
old time and take such taxes
as are approved by the High
Commissioner, but they will
obey the laws of the Governor
and will act in accordance
with the advice of the
Resident. [39]

Political administration under
the Crown

Further information: Northern Nigeria
Protectorate , Southern Nigeria Protectorate and
Provinces of Nigeria
The British Colonial Office in
Westminster , created in the 1860s
by architect George Gilbert Scott ;
illustrated in 1875
Contemporary photograph of the
same building, now housing the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Transition to Crown rule